

HOW BOMBAY WAS CEDED

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BY

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(St. Xavier's College, Bombay)

BOMBAY

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
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BOMBAY FORT IN 1668.

J. Orvington.

HOW BOMBAY WAS CEDED

I Summary of the Treaty

Treaty of 1661

The Marriage Treaty of 1661 is a 'long and intricate document'.¹ Perhaps it was meant to be so, since it was drawn up by politicians in the furtherance of political interests, both contracting parties professing a friendship which was of too recent a date to be genuine, and each endeavouring to get the better of the other. But by passing the drag-net of scrutiny through the waters of verbosity, a few honest fishes may be caught.

The Treaty, which is retrospective and ratifies all treaties made since the year 1641,² deals with the two contracting kingdoms, with other countries and places, and with persons. It aims at establishing a strict friendship between England and Portugal³; the former shall promote the interests and welfare of the latter⁴; the English fleet shall assist Portugal whenever Portugal is invaded,⁵ or the port of Lisbon is beset by the Spaniards. England shall make no treaty with Spain which may make it impossible for her to render this promised assistance to Portugal.⁶

As regards other countries and places, Tangier⁷ and Bombay⁸ are to be ceded to the English King. At Goa, Cochin, Diu, Bahia de Todos los Sanctos, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and in the Dominions of the King of Portugal in the West Indies, English merchants shall enjoy the same privileges as the Portuguese.⁹ If the English conquer from the Dutch a territory that formerly belonged to Portugal, they shall not surrender it to Portugal, an exception being made in the case of Muscat and Ceylon. If Ceylon falls into English hands, the town of Colombo shall be ceded to the Portuguese;

¹ Sheppard, *Bombay*, p. 9. ² Article I. ³ First introductory paragraph.

⁴ Art. 15. ⁵ Art. 16. ⁶ Art. 18. ⁷ Art. 2 & 3. ⁸ Art. 11. ⁹ Art. 12 & 13.

the port of Galle shall be ceded to the English¹; Dunkirk and Jamaica shall never be ceded to Spain.²

With respect to persons, the Treaty settles the marriage between Charles II and Catherine of Portugal.³ Catherine is to be officially received on board the British Admiral-ship; her dowry is fixed; she is to be conveyed to, and welcomed in, England; she is permitted the free practice of the Catholic religion; she is to receive £30,000 yearly; she is to have her own household; if she survives her husband, she is free to leave England, but will continue to receive her annual allowance.⁴ She renounces all rights of inheritance in Portugal except the Crown.⁵ Finally, Charles II and Alphonsus VI promise faithfully to observe the clauses of this Treaty.⁶

The secret article, which follows the Treaty, is mainly concerned with the Netherlands. England promises to endeavour to make peace between Portugal and the Netherlands, not to enter into a treaty with them to which Portugal is not a party, and to defend the Portuguese in the East. Any territory captured by the Dutch after the opening of the peace negotiations must be restored to the Portuguese.

Origin of the Treaty

Marriages, they say, are made in heaven. But there was nothing heavenly about Charles II's marriage with Catherine, since it was in the strict sense a political marriage. With the connivance, if not at the instigation, of the French King, Louis XIV, the Portuguese Ambassador offered Charles the hand of Catherine of Braganza, the sister of the young king Alphonsus VI, with a dowry of two million cruzados, the cession of Tangier and Bombay, and other valuable mercantile concessions. Never was such a tempting offer made to a marriageable Prince in sore need of money.⁷ If Portugal offered more than she could afford to give, it was because the country was in desperate straits; for, though the rebellion of 1640 had put an end to Spanish rule in Portugal, Spain was still trying

¹ Art. 14. ² Art. 18. ³ The first three introductory paragraphs.

⁴ Art. 4-10. ⁵ Art. 19. ⁶ Art. 20.

⁷ Lingard-Belloc, *The History of England*, Vol. IX, p. 26.

to recover her lost sovereignty and was sure to succeed if Portugal were left unaided and alone. Hence Luisa de Guzman, the widow of John of Braganza, shrank from no sacrifice to gain the English alliance.¹ The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, therefore,—and the cession of Bombay which is mentioned in Article XI—originated with Portugal.

Cession of Bombay

Those who commended or condemned the cession of Bombay in 1661 were mainly swayed by personal interests and did not suspect the great future that was in store for the then insignificant harbour-settlement on the west coast of India. Hence the discussions to which the cession gave rise were locally circumscribed within comparatively narrow limits. It was only later, when navigators and merchants realised the importance of Bombay as a commercial asset, that historians began to ask themselves how Bombay came to be surrendered.

In answering this question it must be borne in mind that, next to the Spaniards, Portugal's most formidable foe were the Dutch, who were trying to deprive her of her colonial empire in the East, and such had been hitherto their success that the day did not seem far distant when they would gain possession of all her territories in India, Goa included. Bombay was offered to the English King with a double purpose: to put an end to the Spanish danger in Europe and cripple Dutch aggressiveness in the East. William Foster is therefore right in saying that the cession of Bombay was due neither to solicitation on the part of the British Government at home nor to pressure from the British Authorities in India.²

It is difficult, however, to see eye to eye with Foster when, in his anxiety to prove that the Treaty was in no way due to the eagerness of the Company to secure Bombay Island, he tries to show that they were not at all anxious to become masters of Bombay. For, when the news of the surrender of Bombay reached Surat, it

¹ Lodge, *The Political History of England*, Vol. VIII, p. 21.

² Foster, E.F.I., 1661-1664, p. 123-124.

was welcomed there with feelings of undisguised delight. The following passage occurs in a letter from Surat to Masulipatam, dated the 15th December, 1661:

“We are friends with the Governor [of Surat], though it is no matter if we are out [not?], our Royal Master being married ¹ to the Infanta of Portugal, and in dowry, besides a vast sum of ready money, has Goa and many other places. Twelve ships are coming and 4,000 men, which we have letters already of from Aleppo. Every day we wait the confirmation”.²

Bombay is not mentioned here, perhaps it was deemed too insignificant a place to be recorded as part of a royal dowry. When the English King was condescending to marry the Infanta of Portugal, nothing less than Goa was expected as a dowry, Bombay and other places being thrown in to eke out the gift.

Thus thought the Factors at Surat, who were not, however, the only ones to have rather hazy ideas about the clauses of the Treaty of 1661. A letter from Bantam, which reached Batavia on 20th October, 1661, said that two merchants, John Raling and Vincent Vette, who had arrived at Bantam in an English vessel, had visited the Dutch Establishment, and brought the news that, on the occasion of the English King's marriage with the Portuguese Princess, all the territories possessed by the Portuguese in India were ceded to the English by way of dowry.³

The delight felt at Surat at the supposed acquisition of Goa and many other places can readily be explained. For some time past the English in India had been looking for a fortified place on the west coast, which would check the rapidly growing influence of the Dutch. For the Dutch were trying to capture the monopoly of the cinnamon trade, as they had done that of other spices. Nor were they likely to leave the Portuguese in undisturbed possession of their settlements on the Malabar coast, which was rich in pepper; and if this commodity became their exclusive trade, they would be

¹ Unless the phrase ‘*Our Royal Master being married to the Infanta of Portugal*’ is given the meaning of the future tense, the Surat Factors were slightly ahead of time; for their rejoicing is recorded in December 1661, and the marriage between Charles II and Catherine of Portugal took place on the 22nd May, 1662.

² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 29.

³ *Dagh Register gehouden int Casteel Batavia*, 1661, p. 330.

the sole exporters of the most profitable colonial products. There was even a possibility that the Portuguese would be driven out of the East altogether—a truly alarming prospect, rendered probable by the inherent weakness of a colonial empire which consisted of thousands of miles of coast without a hinter-land. Hence it was of the utmost importance that the Dutch should be arrested in their conquest of the Portuguese dominions in India; or, if this could not be done, that the English should have on the west coast a strongly fortified place, which might inspire the Dutch with a wholesome fear.

This need was all the more felt, because British influence at Surat was greatly impaired by Dutch aggressiveness. The President and Council at Surat wrote to the Company on the 23rd March, 1653:

“As yet we cannot get this Governor [of Surat] to declare how far he will secure us; for he is of so small courage that the Dutch with great words do overawe him, that he dares do nothing till he hears from the King [the Mogul Emperor], whom he had advised of what passed between the Dutch and us, and how prejudicial this will be unto this port [Surat] and country, wherein he seems much to take our parts.”¹

The Surat Factors even thought of abandoning the place:

“And we have also largely advised Mr. Jesson at Agra with all passages, and given orders that he repair to the King [the Mogul Emperor], and not only acquaint him with our position, but also procure the most safety he can for us; upon whose answer we shall resolve what to do, either in residing here, or of retreating to some other place.”²

“We were never so sensible of the want of a port in these parts (as that we might call our own) as we are at present, and are like to be if these wars continue. Doubtless a fair opportunity may now present by a treaty with the Portugal, who has enough to spare, and we believe willing to spare on easy terms. Bombay and Bassein which is se[cure?] would be very convenient for you.”³

This was not the first time that the Authorities at home were informed that, in the opinion of the English in India, Bombay would prove a valuable acquisition. On the occasion of the war

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1651-1654, p. 169. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 170.

with Holland in 1652, information to that effect had been sent to England, when the proposal, if not approved, was at least taken into consideration; for the Company drew up a petition asking Cromwell to procure for them the cession of Bombay and Bassein in India, and of Mozambique in Africa. But there is no evidence that any effective step was taken in the matter; and the peace treaty, signed with the Portuguese Ambassador in 1654, and ratified at Lisbon in 1656, makes no reference to the subject.

This was all the more disappointing as in April 1654, John Spiller had informed the Company:

"Your business and our nation's repute was never, since our first trading in India, at so low an ebb and in so ill a condition.¹ . . . However, matters might be considerably improved, especially if you could get into your hands, about Surat or on the coast of India some convenient town or castle, which doubtless in a short time would greatly flourish and be a means that you will not only enjoy a profitable but a commanding trade, and be a means much to increase your strength, force and honour in the [se] Oriental parts, as the actions of the Dutch can too well witness, who look not nor stand so much upon present gains (if they have hopes that a place will prove at last beneficial) as their future profit: which makes them disburse so much money on their fortifications as to make them defensible, and not for the name or show, let it cost them what it will."²

The Company fully entered into the views of their servants in India. On the 28th January, 1657, Henry Revington had reminded them:

"Affronts are often put upon us, who, being not under one head, we do not know how to remedy ourselves; by which means we are trampled on by the greatest enemies as well as enviers to our trade and nation, the Dutch; which through our divisions have prevailed over the Portugal's weakness and attempted things our own interests would [should] never have permitted in yearly gaining several forts from him [the Portugal] and it is to be feared [the Dutch] will, before many years pass, be masters of all his places here, unless you endeavour to prevent it by reuniting and taking possession of some of their holds; which we well remember some few years past there were some such business in hand: and no better time to look after it than now."³

¹ Ibid., p. 270. ² Ibid., p. 272. ³ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1660, p. 115.

It would seem that the Company now thought it was time to bestir themselves. On the 9th April, 1658, they wrote:

"We do hereby give you power to treat for the obtaining of the said port of Danda Rajpuri, Bassein, Bombay or Corapatam [Kharepatam, on the Viziadrug River], or such healthful place upon the coast of Malabar as you shall upon certain knowledge and information know to be fit for securing our shipping, and that has a good inlet into the country, and trade, and such conveniences and accommodation as are necessary for a settlement, provided that such a place or port may be procured on such reasonable terms as formerly has been proposed, or not exceeding the sum of four, five or six thousand pounds in the purchase; but, if the place answers all the ends before expressed, we give you further commission, as you shall see occasion, not exceeding 8000 pounds at the utmost; so that also you may be in a condition or capacity to keep possession of the same, and that the charge will probably be maintained by the custom and revenue of the place."¹

The Company were ready to spend money, but not to squander it; they wanted their money's worth and even more; such a settlement as the Company wished to acquire is not found ready-made, but has to be built up in the course of years; and if it were extant, it would not be for sale.

About a year later, in March 1659, the Company reminded the Surat Council of their previous instructions regarding the acquisition of a town on the west coast, and even suggested a settlement of their own choice:

"We question not but you will remember what commission we gave you in our letter of the 9th April last, concerning the treating for the obtaining of the Port of Danda Rajpuri, Bassein, Bombay, etc., and the sum therein limited to be disbursed in that employment. We have some hopes that you have already made some progress herein, as you have seen occasion administered. But, if you have not, then we desire that you take notice that we have here again resumed the debate of this business, and do conclude that Danda Rajpuri will be a very commodious and secure place to settle upon, being so situated as that in respect of trade to Persia, Mocha, Acheen, etc., and the freeness from the troubles and dangers that is preferred far before Surat. And thereupon require that you take this subject into your considerations and to prosecute the same what possibly may be, having reference to our prelimited sum of money, which we would not have you exceed."²

¹ Ibid., p. 151. ² Ibid., pp. 207-208.

Whatever may have been the importance of Danda Rajpuri as a naval station, it is difficult to understand that the Company should have given it an unqualified preference to Surat. They must have had a very poor knowledge of India not to have been aware that commercially Surat enjoyed pride of place, whilst Danda Rajpuri was nowhere. Perhaps their preference of Danda Rajpuri may be partly accounted for by their hope to get it cheap:

"The Company have formerly been sufferers by the people of Rajpuri, having sustained a loss of 40,000 Rupees by robbing of their kafilas [caravans] by Jacob Chawne [Yakut Khan], and the goods sent by him to Malik Amber into the castle of Danda Rajpuri. Some satisfaction for the loss was recovered by the reprisal of some vessels of Decan [the Deccan], but not sufficient to discharge their debt; and therefore we have a warrantable occasion in our hands to endeavour a forced restitution from them, which else will never be obtained; which we hereby refer to your management, if you shall find it possible and likely to be brought to our desired issue, namely, [i.e., especially] in relation to the getting into our possession the prementioned place of Danda Rajpuri by some such stratagem as you shall conclude most fitting for the accomplishment thereof."¹

This time the Company were in real earnest, they even referred to their schemes in a letter written on the 22nd August, 1659, to Persia:

"The consideration of the Dutchees' great success in India, in the gaining of several places, has incited you to put us in mind to procure some place that we might call our own, and be masters of, lest the Dutch pretending some injuries from the Mogul may block up Suvali and deprive us of trade. This we have already had in our thoughts, and have given commission to our President and Council [of Surat] to endeavour to accomplish, and hope he will bring it to a good issue."²

Meanwhile the Surat Factors were of opinion that the Danda Rajpuri scheme was impracticable. On the 10th January, 1660, they wrote to the Company:

"As we are not idle to inform ourselves of the accomplishment of your desires for Danda Rajpuri, so we are not able to do more than inform, because we have neither men nor moneys to prosecute any such design. It is not beyond our reach; for, had we the means, we could soon make you masters

¹ Ibid. ² Ibid., note.

of the place. And in the meantime will inform ourselves of Bombay and another place called Vissava [Versova, 12 miles north of Bombay] near that bay, which is worth the notice; that, if we fail of one, we may not fail of all. To that purpose we shall now go down to view it, and overland give you a description of that place; the latter places being the Portugals', who are willing to entertain us [as] their neighbours, but dare not without the leave of the King of Portugal; which please to procure there; a good port may easily be obtained here, before the insulting Dutch gain all."¹

Shortly afterwards a party of five, consisting of President Andrews, Mathew Foster, Mathew Gray, Thomas Rolt and Henry Gary, made a voyage down the coast to spy out the land:

"We proceeded into Bassein; and from there Mr. Foster and Mr. Henry Gary set forward for the Vissava to view it. The description, given already, is agreeing to that now given; and if the place is procured, it will prove a safe harbour for shipping that shall go in so timely that the southerly monsoon is not begun. We have since treated with the Governors of Goa for the settling of a factory there (but could not obtain our desires), that we might have been nearer in order to the accomplishing your commands on Danda Rajpuri, which we intended ourselves to have viewed (and was one of our ends in going down), had not the consideration of the rumour that it would make in the world (for the Portugals would have known of it) [prevented us?]; therefore [we] shall make use of others to render us an account."²

The Surat Authorities were not sanguine about the acquisition of a place on the west coast, and they started making proposals to the Arabs to establish a factory at Muscat. But the Company on being informed of this, would not hear of it:

"Now if this your design have taken effect (as we hope it has not), we do hereby declare that it is altogether to our dislike, and that we disown this your undertaking, it being contrary to that commission which we gave unto you, which directed and empowered you to treat the obtaining of Danda Rajpuri, Bassein, Bombay, or Carapatan, or such other healthful place on the coast of Malabar as upon certain knowledge or information you should find fit for the securing of our shipping, and that had a good inlet into the country, and trade, and other conveniences therein mentioned; not giving you liberty to engage us in this place [Muscat], which (for ought we can collect) is not only a very unhealthful place, but an inconvenient and a chargeable place, and not consistent with our advantage and profit."³

¹ Ibid., p. 214. ² Ibid., p. 300. ³ Ibid., pp. 320-321.

This reprimand had the desired effect; and in June 1660, Roger Middleton and Edward Lloyd were deputed by the Surat Council to start on a voyage of exploration to look for a place of residence where a fort might be built. The two had to visit Danda Rajpuri, several islands situated on the mouth of the river Karwar, and then to pay a visit to Goa:

"And while doing, at your visiting the Governors [at Goa], if occasion present, discourse of the island called Ellephanta (Elephanta Island), lying in Bombay; if you see time, craving leave to reside on it with the consent of the owner, using such arguments unto them as your experience will best dictate."¹

This was written in June 1660, and shows that from 1653 to 1660 the cession of Bombay was in the minds of the Surat Factors and the London Directors.

To corroborate this conclusion we may briefly recall the reasons brought forward by Foster to prove the contrary. He gives three reasons to prove that the Company were not anxious to possess Bombay: (1) Bombay, which was ceded in 1661, was totally different from the establishment which the Company had given their servants orders to buy for a price ranging from 4,000 to 8,000 pounds. (2) In the autumn of 1661, when Lord Clarendon asked the Company whether they were ready to take over Bombay or at least to have a part of the charge, they decided that it would not be advantageous to adopt either course, and respectfully declined. (3) In November 1667, when the Company at last agreed to the transfer of Bombay, they assured the Treasury Commissioners that, if the Portugals had offered them the island before His Majesty was possessed thereof, the Company would not have accepted it.²

As regards the first reason, it is obvious that Bombay, as it was ceded in 1661, did not fulfil any of the conditions laid down by the Company in their letter of 1658 for the purchase of a settlement on the west coast; but it must not be forgotten that in 1658 the Company were ready to spend up to £8,000 and wanted to get their money's worth. Hence they hedged their resolve to

¹ *Ibid.*, pp 332-333. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 124.

spend £8,000 with so many conditions that no town extant was likely to fulfil them all. But from this it cannot be inferred, as Foster does, that the Company were not anxious to gain possession of Bombay, if they could without spending a farthing. To assume that the Company were in both cases guided by the same principles, is to ignore the long standing desire of the Surat Factors and of the London Directors to secure on the west coast a settlement which they might call their own—Bombay being on several occasions mentioned as a suitable place.

Nor can anything to the contrary be inferred from the Company's refusal, in the autumn of 1661, to take over Bombay or bear part of its cost. This offer was made in the autumn of 1661, after the signing of the Treaty on the 23rd June, 1661. This explains the refusal of the Company either to take over Bombay or to bear part of the charge. The acceptance of either alternative would have entailed considerable expense, and the Directors, who were shrewd merchants, naturally declined to pay for what they could get for nothing. By the Treaty Bombay became the King's property, and the King paid for its military upkeep; the Company had all they wanted—the privilege to make use of Bombay as a trading station.

Finally, as regards the solemn declaration made in November 1667 "that if the Portugals had offered them the island before His Majesty was possessed of it, the Company would not have accepted it", it is astonishing that Foster should attach any importance to it. In fact, in 1667 the Company was most anxious to get possession of Bombay, as Foster himself, apparently forgetful of his own previous statement, points out in a subsequent volume of his great work, where he writes:

"In 1667, negotiations were in progress for the transfer of the island [of Bombay] to the Company. As we know, the latter had long had an eye on Bombay as one of the possibilities for the fortified settlement it desired to make on the western side of India; and several troubles that had risen since its occupation by the King's troops, such as the private trade indulged in or contemplated by its Governors, the friction between the latter and the

Company's President, and Cook's seizure of the Surat junk, had made it seem desirable that control should be gained of the island."¹

It is hardly possible to adduce more convincing proof that the declaration made in 1667 by the Treasury Commissioners should not be taken seriously. The Gentlemen of the Company who made this declaration to the Treasury Commissioners of King Charles were mainly bent on striking a good bargain. They played a game of bluff and were believed, so that Bombay Island became the Company's property without their having to incur any expenses.

From all this evidence it may, therefore, be safely inferred that, far from being in any way disinclined to become masters of Bombay, the Surat Factors and the London Directors were longing to do so; to them the Treaty of 1661 was a piece of unexpected good fortune.

Aftermath

From a summary of the various articles of the Treaty, given in the opening paragraph, it is clear that the Portuguese paid dear for English protection against the designs of Spain and the Netherlands. It is likely that they later regretted the cession of Bombay; for they received nothing in return for it. It is true that the English had promised to check Dutch encroachments in India; but England never had an occasion to fulfil this promise. A few weeks after the signing of the marriage treaty, a peace treaty was drawn up between Portugal and the Netherlands; but the treaty was not ratified by Portugal and Holland until 1662, so that the news of peace having been concluded reached Batavia on the 14th June, 1663.² This delay was fatal to Portuguese interests in India, for in January and February 1663, Cochin and Cannanore had been conquered by the Dutch. Nor was it possible for the Portuguese on the occasion to ask for English assistance, for at that very time the Portuguese were trying to prevent the English from getting possession of Bombay.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, pp. 310-311.

² *Dagh Register Gehouden int Casteel Batavia*, 1663, p. 236.

Strange Contention

It has been written: "Closer examination of the Treaty of 1661 shows clearly enough that it was a one-sided bargain [in favour of Portugal], and its execution revealed at once the hollow foundations on which that imposing fabric was reared; Tangier proved weak, barren and expensive; Catherine was dull, plain and sickly; and Charles found it difficult to extract a satisfactory sum from the impecunious, elderly hidalgos . . . It was however the proviso relating to Bombay that proved a source of constant trouble to Portugal and England:"¹

By way of comment it may be pointed out that the remark about Catherine's dullness, plainness and sickliness is unfortunate, and as unexpected as it is irrelevant according to non-Muhammadan standards. Besides this, Tangier was not bartered for English protection on account of its fertility, but because of its strategic position; and strategic places are often barren, and their upkeep may prove expensive. The same applies to a certain extent to Bombay. Moreover Dr. Khan's appreciation is singularly inadequate; he does not mention any of the commercial advantages granted to the English, of which mention is made in the 12th and 13th articles of the Treaty: trading privileges "in the towns of Goa, Cochin and Diu, in the city of Bahia de Todos los Santos (or St. Salvadore's Bay), Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro, and throughout all the dominions of the King of Portugal in the West Indies."²

It is strange that Dr. Khan should have overlooked these concessions; for in their light the Treaty of 1661, instead of being a one-sided bargain in favour of Portugal, proved of great advantage to England. In fact the Treaty makes it plain that Portuguese power at home and abroad was on the decline; this alone explains why Portugal was ready to make such great sacrifices to secure England's protection against Spain and Holland.

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 440. ² Articles 12 & 13.

II The Eleventh Article

Source of Trouble

The 11th article of the Treaty of 1661 deals with the cession of Bombay, and it calls for special study; for after the fashion of those luckless individuals—black sheep they are usually called—who have a talent for causing endless trouble to their kith and kin, the said 11th article was mainly responsible for the dissensions that followed in the wake of the treaty. It cannot be gainsaid indeed that never did treaty more dismally fail to bring about the end for which it had been devised. Instead of inaugurating a new era of friendship, it gave rise to animosity and antipathy. Nor was this unforeseen result due to dishonesty of purpose on the part of the contracting parties, it was rather an unavoidable evil inherent in the 11th article on account of its regrettable vagueness as regards both the geographical limits of the ceded territories and the nature of the religious freedom guaranteed to the inhabitants.

Geographical Vagueness

According to the 11th article:

“The King of Portugal with the assent and advice of his Council gives, transfers and, by these presents, grants and confirms to the King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors, forever, the port and island of Bombay in the East Indies, with all rights, profits, territories and appurtenances whatsoever thereunto belonging, and together with the income and revenue the direct full and absolute dominion and sovereignty of the said port, island and premises with all their royalties, freely, entirely and absolutely.”

It would be difficult to make a finer terminological display. Nevertheless this imposing array of words fails to impress, if it is taken into account that the Authorities at home knew nothing of Bombay; and one of them, Clarendon, the Lord Chancellor, foolishly left on record that they meant:

“Forever to annex to the Crown of England the island of Bombay, with the towns and castles therein, which are a very little distance from Brazil.”¹

¹ Clayton, *Personal Memoirs*; Vol. II, p. 189.

The great mistake of those who drew up the 11th article was that they did not consult the Factors of Surat, who were in a position to give them reliable information. They bargained for the cession of the island of Bombay, apparently unaware of it that there are islands and islands.

It has been suggested that it was clearly understood in London that the ceded territories comprised, not only the island on which Bombay is situated, but also the larger one to the northward known as Salsette.¹ But the reasons brought forward to buttress up this contention do not carry conviction. Foster stresses the fact that in August 1661 Sir Richard Fanshaw, when about to sail for Lisbon as English ambassador, was instructed by the King to obtain the town of Bassein.

"You shall very earnestly press that Bassein may likewise be put into our hands, which we insisted on in our demand, and understood by the answer made us that the ambassador had power committed to him to have consented to the same; but he, protesting against having any such power, prevailed with us to leave the same out of the treaty. Therefore you shall confer freely with him upon it, and let him know that we depend upon him still to assist us in the procuring thereof; and in the managing those instances you shall govern yourself by his advice; and if he does wish that you should for the present suspend any such demand, as presuming that it cannot be reasonable or effectual, you shall forbear it accordingly."²

From these instructions Foster infers that, as Bassein guards the channel running round the northern side of the island of Salsette, the territories to the south of this channel, Salsette and Bombay, were included in the phrase 'the said port, island [of Bombay] and premises.'

It may however be pointed out that Foster himself speaks of the island of Salsette as distinct from that of Bombay. Furthermore his inference is based on a geographical knowledge of Bombay and its surroundings, which the English King and his Councillors did not possess. One may rightly wonder whether they knew at all that Bassein was situated to the north of Bombay. The instructions given to Sir Richard Fanshaw prove indeed that

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 126. ² Ibid., pp. 126-127.

the English King was anxious to get possession of Bassein; but they do not warrant the conclusion that Bassein bordered on the territories ceded by the Treaty of 1661.

The geographical vagueness of the 11th article is clearly proved by repeated attempts to adduce external evidence to specify what was meant by the phrase the said port, island [of Bombay] and premises.

On the 26th September, 1662, Gerald Aungier wrote to Surat:

"But which gives him [Lord Marlborough] the greatest disturbance is that the place does not answer our King's expectations by four-fifths of what was represented to him; for by the draught [map], which was delivered to His Majesty, Bombay, Salsette and Thana were included all in one island under the name and royalty of Bombay. But Captain Browne and myself, having sailed round the island, do find it far otherwise, being in extent scarce one-fifth part of the other two islands; and this is all the Portuguese intend to surrender at last to us; which how it will be resented in England, I leave Your Worship's wisdom to conjecture."¹

There is a second reference to this map on the 25th July, 1663. Towards the end of June of that year,² Marlborough was back in England, and gave a detailed account of what had taken place in Bombay Island. Thereupon the following memorial was presented to the Portuguese ambassador on the 25th July, 1663.

"Moreover His Majesty insists very earnestly that, not only justice be done upon the Viceroy, who has so falsely and unworthily failed in the surrender of the island promised to His Majesty there, but that reparation be made for the loss he has sustained in sending ships and men to take possession of it, the charges whereof are valued by the officers of His Majesty's Navy to amount at least unto one hundred thousand pounds sterling; and that likewise more effective orders be reiterated for the surrender of the said island to the full extent formerly entrusted to His Majesty in the map containing not only Bombay but Salsette and Thana, and so promised to His Majesty, for the possession of which the troops are yet detained there, suffering much inconvenience in the expectation of it."³

A third reference to this map is made by Pepys on the 5th September, 1663:

¹ Ibid., p. 134. ² Ibid., p. 227. ³ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 513.

"The Portuguese made the King, and Lord Chancellor, and other learned men about the King believe that that [Bombay] and other islands which are near it, are all in one place; and so the draught [map] was drawn and presented to the King, and believed by the King, and expected to prove so when our men came thither; but it is quite otherwise."¹

This triple reference to the map would preclude every possible doubt as to its existence, if it represented a triple source of independent information. But this is not the case. It has been asserted that Pepys relied on information supplied by Captain Minors,² an assertion which it has been impossible to substantiate. Pepys himself does not say so, nor does Captain Minors mention the map in any of his extant letters known to the present writer. It is therefore probable that Pepys' assertion was ultimately based on Aungier's letter of the 26th September, 1662. But even if Pepys should have had his information from Captain Minors, this would not give any additional value to his testimony; for in 1662, both Gerald Aungier and Captain Minors were in Bombay; so that Aungier and Minors stand for one and the same source of information.

This inference, so far from being made haphazardly, is unexpectedly warranted by internal evidence supplied by Aungier's letter of the 26th September, 1662, and by the memorial of the 25th July, 1663. Aungier together with Captain Brown sailed round the island; they also made the discovery that there were three islands: Bombay, Salsette and Thana! As Foster pointedly remarks: "No justification can be found for treating the portion of Salsette, which contains Thana, as a separate island".³ If Englishmen on the spot were liable to make such geographical mistakes, it is of little avail to bring forward arguments based on the geographical knowledge of Englishmen at home. But apart from this, the main point to be kept in view is that in the memorial the same mistake occurs; which goes a long way to prove that the two documents are not independent sources of information, but one and the same piece of documentary evidence.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 126. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 133.

As regards the memorial of the 25th July, 1663, it should not be lost sight of that its allusion to the map was made one month after Marlborough's return to England. The news that the Portuguese had refused to surrender Bombay reached England on the 11th May, 1663,¹ about six or seven weeks before Marlborough's arrival. Thereupon the Secretary of State wrote at once to Sir Richard Fanshaw to remonstrate in the strongest terms against this violation of the Treaty,² but no mention was then made of the map. It would seem as though everybody had forgotten all about it, till Marlborough opportunely reminded them of its existence; so that the question naturally offers: Is there any other proof of the map's existence beyond Marlborough's testimony? As to the triple reference to the map, it is ultimately traceable to one and the same source, some member or members of the Expeditionary Force sent out to take possession of Bombay. Until further evidence be brought forward, the belief in the existence of the map can hardly be compared to a house built on the rock.

What further militates against the unquestioned existence of this map is that nobody thought of producing it, which was the obvious thing to do, since this would have settled the disputed point. Shall we say that the map got lost? or that the Portuguese, after having imposed on the English, took it back to Portugal? Either alternative implies an incredible carelessness on the part of English statesmen, who are known to be singularly shrewd in the drawing up of treaties. Nobody thought of producing the map either in 1663 or in the years immediately following, when the map would have proved invaluable; for at that time the Portuguese, basing themselves on the Marriage Treaty, would cede nothing else but Bombay Island, exclusive of Mahim and Colaba.

It was only in 1676 that a search for this map was made, which proved however fruitless; and on the 16th January, 1677, Sir Robert Southwell made a report:

"Touching the map of Bombay, which could not be found, as also concerning the commission and instructions of Sir Gervase Lucas.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 226. ² *Ibid.*, p. 227.

"In order to redress injuries, complained of by the East India Company, received at Bombay, Your Lordships directed inquiry to be made first for the map presented by the Portugal ambassador, when that place was offered in the Treaty; which map would have certainly cleared up the point in question; and next the commission and instructions given to Sir Gervase Lucas, when he went to the government of that place, to rectify all abuses that had been offered in the non-surrender or in the surrender but of part [of] what by the Treaty was intended.

"As for the map, neither by the Lord Clarendon, who has made search after it, nor [by] Sir William Morrice, then Secretary of State, who acknowledged the receipt of a small box of plantation papers to the old Lord Clarendon at his departure, nor by Sir Philip Warwick, who lived with the Earl of Southampton at the time the Council sat at the Earl's house, and that the said map was there exposed, can any manner of tidings be had thereof.

"And as to the said commission and instructions (which doubtless contained the end and purpose of that map), I can learn no news of them in the offices. But hearing that Sir Jeffrey Palmer was consulted as to the powers of the commission, I made inquiry with Mr. Johnson, then clerk of the Patents, but he can neither remember or find any footsteps thereof. It is probable both are at Bombay, where Sir Gervase Lucas died, and so in the hands of the Company's President."¹

Sir Robert Southwell was firmly convinced of the existence of the map, and he quotes in full the reference found in the memorial presented to the Portuguese ambassador on the 25th July, 1663. His surmise that the commission of, and the instructions to, Sir Gervase Lucas 'doubtless contained the end and purpose of that map' has turned out baseless and futile. For a copy of Lucas's commission and of his instructions has been traced by Foster, but no allusion is made therein to the missing map.²

This fruitless search put an end to all further appeal to this map. Meanwhile the Authorities, who ordered the search to be made, are unimpeachable witnesses that, as far as the territorial delineations are concerned, the 11th article of the Treaty of 1661 was hopelessly inadequate owing to its geographical vagueness, each party being at liberty to interpret the article as they liked,

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., pp. 524-526. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, p. 191.

the English claiming what the Portuguese denied. Nor can the oft-repeated charges of dishonesty made against the Portuguese be brought home to them by merely appealing to the wording of the 11th article, and still less by bringing forward a non-existing map.

Religious Vagueness

In the next place the 11th article of the Treaty of 1661 was a source of countless difficulties, because the provisions made to safeguard the religious rights of Catholics were drawn up in such general terms that their interpretation and application depended entirely on the religious persuasion of the individuals who were entitled either to claim or to grant the said promised privileges. This religious proviso runs as follows:

"In pursuance of this cession, the inhabitants of the said island (as subjects of the King of Great Britain and under his sovereignty, crown, jurisdiction and government) being permitted to remain there and to enjoy the free exercise of the Catholic religion in the same manner as they do at present; it being always understood, as it is now declared once for all, that the same regulations shall be observed for the exercise of the Catholic religion in Tangier and all other places, which shall be delivered by the King of Portugal into the possession of the King of Great Britain, as were stipulated and agreed to on the surrender of Dunkirk into the hands of the English."¹

Briefly to sum up, the Catholic inhabitants of Bombay were to enjoy the free exercise of their religion as they had heretofore. The reference to Dunkirk was particularly unfortunate; for the conditions obtaining there were poles apart from those prevailing in Bombay Island, the one being a Catholic township, the other a non-Christian country occupied by Catholic settlers. It is therefore but natural that in the dissensions which ensued, neither party ever spoke of Dunkirk as a typical instance of the religious policy to be followed in Bombay Island.

The proviso that Catholics should be allowed the free exercise of their religion as heretofore, might mean either so much or so little. In the days prior to the English occupation the Catholic religion was in Bombay Island for all practical purposes the state-

¹ Forrest, S. H. S., Vol. I, pp. IX-X.

religion. Hindus and Muhammadans were not free to worship in public, and the question of tolerating Protestant worship had not arisen. It was in this light that the Portuguese interpreted the phrase the free exercise of their religion as heretofore. The question is not, whether this interpretation meets with the reader's approval; what matters, is that the proviso logically lent itself to the interpretation given to it by the Catholic inhabitants of Bombay Island. This must be borne in mind to realise the discontent which arose when the new masters of Bombay decided that all that had been promised, was that Catholics should be tolerated freely to practise their religion. If those responsible for the 11th article had plainly stated that mere toleration was the purport of the religious proviso, the Portuguese would have had no reason to be dissatisfied; but we make bold to add that Portugal would never have subscribed to such a clause.

By way of illustration a number of instances are here brought forward to show how widely the Protestant interpretation differed from the Catholic view.

(1) A first intimation of the British point of view may be gathered from the instructions given in March 1662 to Sir Abraham Shipman, who was in command of the troops sent to occupy Bombay.

"You are to give such encouragement (as securely you may) to such natives and others as shall submit to live peaceably under our obedience . and you are to suffer them the exercise of their own religion without the least interruption or discountenance."¹

This meant a radical change in the religious policy of the island, where Hindus and Muhammadans had been forbidden to worship in public; and from the Portuguese point of view this innovation was an open violation of the Treaty.

(2) That the inhabitants of Bombay never dreamt that the same religious privileges as they themselves enjoyed, should be granted to Hindus and Muhammadans, is made plain in a letter

¹ Khan, A. P. N, B., pp. 523-524.

from Humphrey Cooke, who had come out as Secretary to Sir Abraham Shipman, and afterwards succeeded him as Commander-in-Chief. On the 3rd December, 1665, Cooke wrote to Lord Arlington:

"The Jesuits are much troubled at our being here, and strive all [that] may be to make us unpopular, and have already attempted to take orphans off this island of the Gentoos, Moors and Banyas to force them to be Christians; which if it should be suffered, we shall never make anything of this place; for liberty of conscience makes all the aforementioned desirous to live amongst us. I shall do all [that] may be to give them [the Moors, etc.] encouragement, as His Majesty commands in his instructions. They desire to have churches [temples and mosques], but for the present I have not granted it; neither shall, till I have further orders for it. If I should, the Portugals will strange, in regard they look on it as a scandal to their Church. For the present I have ordered [that] they [i.e., the Hindus, etc.] use their ceremonies in their houses privately, but are not to give scandal to any. It will be necessary that orders be sent what shall be done in this particular."¹

Humphrey Cooke's order to the Hindus and the Muhammadans to worship in private was not an innovation, but the continuation of the then existing practice. At the same time Cooke's hesitation to grant religious freedom to Hindus and Muhammadans and his request for guidance in this matter from the higher authorities, in spite of the King's instructions transmitted to Sir Abraham Shipman, are a clear proof that Portuguese and English differed considerably in the interpretation of the religious proviso contained in the 11th article.

(3) The same policy of granting religious freedom to all was advocated by Henry Gary in charge of the Customs in Bombay Island. On the 22nd March, 1665, he wrote to Lord Arlington:

"There is upon this island a tank [either the Phansi Talao or Gallow's Pond, now included in the enclosure of Victoria railway station, or else near the old temple of Walkeshwar] a pond of water, near unto which many years since, stood a pagoda or temple, where, in the latter, the Banyas worshipped, and in the former purified themselves, multitudes of Banyas resorting to it to this day from near and remote places to wash themselves. But, when the temple was standing, those that came to do their devotions

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, pp. 45-46.

accounted not their vow or their pilgrimage accomplished without the expense of an offering; and if His Majesty would but permit them to erect their temple again, I am confident the benefit that would be reaped by it would be considerable, by a voluntary tribute everyone would give, as that it would much help towards the maintenance of this his garrison. Neither would the permission of this be more scandalous unto our Christian religion than His Holiness permitting in Rome the Jews (who crucified our Blessed Saviour) to have public synagogues: the King of Poland, [the] Republic of Venice, [the] Great Duke of Tuscany, and many other princes and republics permitting them the same privilege without being looked upon as scandalous.”¹

Foster shrewdly remarks that Gary’s advocacy of religious freedom rested largely upon a conviction of its material expediency.² At the same time Gary’s plea that the policy of the Pope, various princes and states justified the granting of religious liberty, implies that it ran counter to the 11th article. If the granting of religious freedom had been in accordance with the Treaty of 1661, there would have been no need of excuses to recommend the introduction of it.

(4) The next step in the religious policy of the new masters of Bombay was the spreading of the Protestant religion by active proselytism, altogether irreconcilable with the privileges enjoyed by the Catholics when the Portuguese ruled in the island. On the 10th March, 1668, the Company wrote to Surat:

“For the better instructing our people in the fear of God and the promoting of His worship in the island [of Bombay] we have entertained two able, godly ministers.”³

(5) Already in those early days the Authorities at Bombay were advised to discriminate against the Catholics. On the 10th March, 1668, the Company wrote to Surat:

“We require that none but English or other of His Majesty’s Protestant subjects be permitted to bear arms in the Fort or Castle; yet for the better security of the town and island, that the inhabitants be put into arms, and reduced into companies, and to keep watches in such out-stations as shall be thought fit, for the prevention of any spoils that may be attempted against the island by the Arabians or others; and if need shall require to join with the English against a more powerful enemy.”⁴

¹ Ibid., pp. 53-54. ² Ibid., p. 53. ³ Missing Papers, Vol. III. ⁴ Ibid.

A Catholic was apparently *ipso facto* a potential traitor and not to be trusted; yet he was expected to fight for those who did not trust him.

(6) When it came to a clash between Catholic and Protestant religious tenets, the Catholic principles were quietly set aside. On the 5th February, 1671, the Surat Council made the following proposals to the Hon'ble Company:

"Whereas for want of English women many of the English and other Protestant soldiers sent out, do marry with Portuguese metis women, natives of the island, who are Roman Catholics, by which means the children of the said Protestants are through their fathers' neglect brought up in the Roman Catholic principles to the great dishonour and weakening [of] the Protestant religion and interest, wherefore for the preventing the evil consequence which may in time accrue therefrom, that the Company would please not only to encourage the sending out of English women, but also establish a standing order that the children of all Protestant fathers be brought up carefully in the Protestant religion, though the mothers thereof be Roman Catholics; and severe penalties be inflicted on all offenders, specially on the Padres who shall endeavour to baptise the said children or any way attempt to inveigle them or entice them away from the Protestant faith."¹

The Protestant viewpoint is here not found fault with; what is questioned is the compatibility of such a proposal with the 11th article, guaranteeing to Catholics the same religious freedom as they had enjoyed heretofore.

(7) Meanwhile other means of proselytising were not neglected. On the 15th December, 1673, the Bombay Authorities wrote to the Company:

"Your pious order for translating the Ten Commandments, the Lord's Prayer and our Creed into the country language, that copies thereof may be dispersed on your island for inviting the inhabitants to embrace our faith, we cannot but highly esteem as a very religious work; and [we] shall put it in practice so soon as a seasonable opportunity shall offer; but please to be informed that this good design must be managed with great secrecy and tenderness, as affairs now stand: freedom of religion being one of the chief motives which invites strangers to settle on your island; and should the present inhabitants or strangers apprehend the least sentiment of fear to be imposed on in that point, it would give a universal discouragement."²

¹ Forrest, S. H. S., Vol. I, p. 55. ² Missing Papers, Vol. V.

What troubled the Bombay Authorities was not what Catholics might say, but the fear lest Protestant proselytism should estrange the goodwill of the non-Christians.

(8) The English Authorities were ready to grant special privileges to Protestant converts, just as the Portuguese had made it their policy to favour Catholic converts. On the 5th March, 1674, the Company wrote to Surat:

“And we have likewise given you directions how you should treat the natives as to their accommodation upon a civil account and in their persuasions in other respects, and to both by way of sufferance not giving any of them disturbance; yet that you shall endeavour to promote and encourage the Protestant Christian religion, and not only to give a good example therein yourselves, but to prefer and encourage those who are steady therein, and whose life and conversations are answerable.”¹

(9) The Directors of the Company continued to remind their servants in Bombay of their zeal to spread the Protestant religion. On the 13th September, 1695, they wrote to Surat:

“We some time since advised you that we had directed the translation of the liturgy of the Church of England into the Portuguese language for the use and benefit of the Portuguese inhabitants under our government in India. We can now tell you that the same together with the Psalms of David are finished and printed at Oxford in folio: and herewith you will receive of them, which we hope our General Council will make the best use of to answer the end of that general and extensive charity which first moved us to this undertaking at our single charge, that so the Gospel and the Protestant religion may be made known to those ignorant natives in their own language to the honour of God and the glory of our Church. We had sent more of them, but that our ships were got to Spithead before we received them in sheets from Oxford.”²

Once more we have no quarrel with those god-fearing gentlemen and their pious impulses. The question however arises whether making converts among the Catholics of Bombay was in accordance with the promise made in the 11th article, according to which the Catholics were guaranteed the free practice of their religion as heretofore.

¹ Ibid., Vol. VI. ² Ibid., Vol. XIX.

(10) How this freedom of practising the Catholic religion was understood by the English Authorities in Bombay may be gathered from the following incident, recorded in a letter written from Bombay to Surat on the 13th April, 1687.

“Since our last, here has happened a business of very ill consequence. The Portuguese Padre of Bombay, by name Frey Joan de Gloria, did in his own parish church christen and receive in the Romish religion one Nathanael Thorpe . which by several statutes is made high treason. Now may it please Your Excellency, &ca, this being a weighty thing to be considered, and much more to be suffered, [we] have legally apprehended the said Padre, and [he] is now in safe custody, until Your Excellency, &ca’s orders about him. We presume Your Excellency, &ca will have the matter stated according to the canons of our church by our Padres [Protestants Padres] here; and we remit the same by this conveniency. The Padre was committed prisoner to the country jail in the Bazar by Judge Vaulk on the 11th instant [11th April, 1687] and laid in the room where Mr. Thormburne was; and yesterday by the earnest intercession of the Padre at Mahim and a strange Padre, the Deputy Governor Mr. Stanly and Mr. Jessop ordered him to be removed from the common jail to his own parish church of Bombay, where he is confined with a guard over him to see that he does not escape nor act in the church, until Your Excellency’s pleasure be known what shall be done in this matter.”¹

(11) The mentality of the English Authorities at Bombay in religious matters may further be gathered from a letter written from Bombay to Surat on the 23rd March, 1683:

“The Deputy Governor does not permit Lieutenant Finch to do any duty, he having turned Roman Catholic since his arrival here, as we have formerly advised you.”²

Similar instances might easily be multiplied; but those here quoted sufficiently prove our main contention that the religious proviso was deplorably vague, since it was liable to be understood by the English in a way of which no Portuguese Catholic could possibly approve.

Conclusion

It has been the practice of official history-writers to lay at the door of the Portuguese Authorities and of the Catholic Padres the

¹ Forrest, S. H. S., Vol. I, pp. 157-158. ² Ibid., p. 156.

many unpleasant incidents that took place when the English took possession of Bombay. The Portuguese Authorities have been openly accused of dishonesty, the Catholic Padres have been branded as disturbers of the peace and plotters of rebellion. Perhaps, in the light of what has here been written on the geographical and religious vagueness of the 11th article of the Treaty of 1661, a more charitable view offers to the reader. After all there are two sides to most questions.

III Decline of Portuguese Power

Traditional View

From what has been said there is no denying that religious differences were to a great extent responsible for the strained relations that marked the intercourse between Englishmen and Portuguese at the time of the cession of Bombay. English historians, in many instances blindly followed and imitated by Indian writers, have made capital out of these dissensions to stress what they call the broad-minded and tolerant policy of the English in India, as contrasted with the bigoted and intolerant attitude of the Portuguese rulers. They would have us believe that the Portuguese went in systematically for a policy of religious persecution, which alienated the goodwill of the Indians and ultimately brought about the downfall of Portuguese power. It may therefore in this connection prove useful to inquire into the causes of the ruinous subversion of the Portuguese settlements in India.

Causes of Downfall

The decline of Portuguese power in India was brought about by a combination of many causes, whose destructive agency may be more easily gauged collectively than individually. Nevertheless it may be said that one of the most untoward events, closely connected with the downfall of Portuguese power in the East, was the 60 years' captivity period, when the Crown of Portugal was united to that of Spain, during the reigns of Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV, from 1581 to 1640. This subordination to Spain was fatal to Portugal's colonial empire. The Indian revenues were absorbed by Spain in her struggle with the Netherlands; and the obstructions put in the way of the Dutch trade with Lisbon—it was entirely prohibited in 1598—induced the latter to go direct to India for that commerce which they had hitherto been content to obtain only at second hand in Lisbon, and which had greatly enriched that country. The success of this enterprise encouraged the English

to follow suit, and the commencement of the 17th century thus brought two rivals into the field to share with Portugal the riches of the eastern trade.¹

It may of course be objected that the Dutch and the English would sooner or later have found their way to India, even if Spain had not interfered in the Dutch trade with Lisbon; which may be readily granted; but this does not do away with the fact that, on the occasion of the Spanish conquest of Portugal, the inhabitants of the latter country could very well say:

De Espanha nem bom vento nem bom casamento.

Apart from this, there were other causes at work inherent in the Portuguese colonial empire. It was an empire without a hinterland. The interior of the country remained practically independent. A successful interior insurrection would sweep the settlers off the coast into the sea, while a successful external aggression from the sea-side would end either in their capitulation or the extermination of the settlement and its defenders. Thus Portuguese power in India rested solely on Portugal's naval supremacy; and when this supremacy was effectively challenged by the Dutch, the Portuguese empire collapsed.

It may be added that among the successors of Albuquerque, who was the founder of Portugal's colonial empire in the East, there were but few who attained to his genius and integrity, whilst many of them were corrupt and incapable.

Besides this, it has been said, but with little regard to truth, that the Portuguese lost their empire owing to their cruelty in their dealings with the Indians. There were of course cruel men among the Portuguese settlers, but it would be grossly unfair to state that it was the policy of the Portuguese systematically to oppress the people. Thus, for example, Albuquerque encouraged intermarriages between his officers and respectable Indian families, and this policy was persistently pursued all through the sixteenth century;

¹ Danvers, R. R. I. O., p. 19.

for the Portuguese never looked down upon the Indians with contempt, and they practically ignored what is euphemistically called the colour bar.

Therefore, the absorption of Portugal by Spain from 1581 to 1640, the entering into the field of rival competitors, the nature of their colonial empire which consisted of long stretches of coastline without a hinterland, and the passing of the naval supremacy from Portuguese into Dutch hands; these were the main causes which brought about the decline of Portuguese influence in the East—their religious policy had very little to do with it.

Religious Policy

However it cannot be gainsaid that the charge is frequently brought against the Portuguese of having freely indulged in religious persecution; and it has been commonly stated that their religious intolerance largely contributed to their downfall. How far is this accusation based on historical facts?

First of all V. A. Smith writes that “the Government of Portugal, under the guidance of John III, a bigoted fanatic, based its policy on making Christians by fair means and foul and engaged in an unsane attempt to force the natives to adopt Christianity.”¹ Smith here alludes to the drastic code of John III; but there is no historical evidence that this code was ever promulgated in Portuguese India; there is much less historical evidence that it was ever put into practice as a whole.

Equally groundless is the charge brought forward by W. W. Hunter. He says: “The Portuguese failed, because they attempted a task altogether beyond their strength, the conversion of India.”² A look at the map³ makes it plain that the Portuguese never attempted the conquest of India. The Portuguese colonial empire was nothing else but a long stretch of coastline, while the interior of the country remained practically independent. This stretch of coastline was 12,000 miles long; nor did the Portuguese occupy it in the strict sense of the word; it was partly under Portuguese

control and partly under Portuguese influence; the control was secured, and the influence was exercised by means of the Portuguese fleet and by means of about 30 fortified towns and fortifications. It is, therefore, historically incorrect to state that the Portuguese attempted to conquer India. The so-called Portuguese empire in India and Burma consisted of the sea-coast from the mouth of the Indus to Meliapur, and from the mouth of the Ganges to Malacca. But if it is historically incorrect to say that the Portuguese attempted to conquer India, it is, as a matter of logical consequence, equally incorrect from an historical point of view to assert that they attempted to convert India. They made conversions in India, they did not attempt to convert India.

Their religious policy was the following. They did not prevent Hindus and Muhammadans from practising their religion in private; but they forbade outward and public acts and signs of worship. The public practice of non-Christian religions was not effectively forbidden along the whole coastline from the mouth of the Indus to Meliapur and from the mouth of the Ganges to Malacca for the simple reason that the Portuguese could not enforce such an injunction; hence the ban was applied within circumscribed and definite areas, specially within the limits of the Portuguese fortified towns. Within the same areas the Portuguese confiscated mosques and temples, converted them into Catholic places of worship, diverted their revenues to the support of Catholic chapels, or even destroyed them, and with their stones erected new churches. But this destruction of mosques and temples was not the outcome of an organised policy; for it was not universally and constantly practised, and those individuals who adopted it would rather seem to have acted on their own initiative.

It was, however, a part of the policy of the Portuguese to extend great privileges to those of their Indian subjects who embraced Christianity. Their converts were exempt from paying taxes, they were eligible to Government-service, they were allowed to live within the precincts of a fort, they could enter into marriage alliances with Portuguese soldiers or settlers; whilst none of these

privileges were vouchsafed to those Hindus and Muhammadans who did not want to change their religious belief.

Again it would seem that within the precincts of their forts the Portuguese compelled such non-Christians as stayed there—mostly shopkeepers, servants and hirelings—to attend religious instructions on Sundays. They had at least to be bodily present and to listen; but it is difficult to ascertain to what extent this practice was adopted, and how far it was consistently carried out.

The Portuguese dealt more summarily with Muhammadan pirates. When a pirate-ship was caught, the crew were simply given the alternative between baptism and death. The same high-handedness characterised their dealings with slaves, either captured in warfare or brought on the slave-market of those days. Slaves captured in warfare were given no choice, they were instructed, baptised and placed as slaves in Christian families; and slaves bought on the market were treated in a similar fashion. Some missionaries made it a point regularly to visit the slave-market, notably at Thana, and to buy up the greatest number possible of children, who were then brought up in the Catholic religion.

There are also instances of Hindu and Muhammadan orphans being confided to the care of the missionaries, a course of action which proved highly objectionable to the relatives of these children, who saw themselves deprived of a share in the joint family property. What became of these properties, whether they were simply confiscated by the civil or the ecclesiastical authorities, or whether they were held in trust and afterwards rendered to their owners, it has been impossible to ascertain. It is difficult to say to what extent this practice obtained. One thing is, however, certain: many writers have profited by it to give free vent to their imagination; and if we were to believe these gentlemen, it would forsooth seem that the Hindu and Muhammadan population along the coastline consisted mainly of orphans.

As regards the Inquisition it must be borne in mind that the Inquisition was never meant to be a means of proselytising. The

Inquisitors dealt not with Hindus or Muhammadans, but with converts to Christianity who had not been sincere in the change of their religious opinions, or who had been sincere, but afterwards changed their mind. When Hindus or Muhammadans were arrayed before this tribunal, it was not because they were Hindus or Muhammadans, but because they indulged publicly in evil practices which were then held to be subversive of the Christian law, specially witchcraft. There is every likelihood that in those days instances of witchcraft were frequently the result of the diseased imagination of the accusing party, just as nowadays the appendicitis mania is responsible for many an operation. Yet, when all is said, the persecution and execution of Hindus and Muhammadans was not within the province of the ordinary activities of the Inquisitors, and proved not to be the rule, but the exception.

It has, therefore, to be admitted that the Portuguese in their dealings with those Indians with whom they came into contact made free use of moral persuasion to make them embrace Christianity. The privileges and advantages granted to converts may have been the cause of these conversions lacking in sincerity and being inspired by selfish motives. The Hindus and Muhammadans who refused to become Christians were in certain circumstances made to suffer for their so-called obstinacy; but in the case of grown-ups the Catholic religion was not thrust down their throat at the point of the sword.

Nor can it be said that the decay and downfall of Portuguese power in the East was the result of their religious policy. The siege of Diu by the Gujarat forces aided by the Pasha of Egypt (1538), the confederation of Bijapur, Golkonda and the Zamorin to drive the Portuguese out of India (1571), and the seizure of Ormus by the Persians were not due directly or indirectly to religious persecutions. These States fought with the Portuguese just as some of them fought with the French and the English.

If history is read correctly, the conclusion arrived at is that, if the Portuguese had encouraged Hindus to practise Hinduism, and if they had exhorted Muhammadans to remain faithful follow-

ers of Islam, they would have been driven out of India all the same. To the best of our knowledge there is not a single instance in which the loss of territory was due to the religious policy of the Portuguese. What happened was that their enemies or their rivals, on more than one occasion, made capital out of the religious policy of the Portuguese to stir up discontent against them, and made them unpopular in order thus to give colour to their own aggressive attempts at territorial aggrandisement.

IV The Expeditionary Force

Preparations

After the signing of the Treaty of 1661 measures were immediately concerted in London to make all the necessary preparations to take possession of the island of Bombay; and on the 27th December, 1661, a Committee of the Privy Council was formed under the presidency of the Duke of York for the purpose of looking after all affairs relating to Bombay in the East Indies.¹

Sir Abraham Shipman was chosen to command the troops to be sent to Bombay; and after the occupation of the island he was to be its governor.

“By these presents [we] do assign constitute and appoint you to be the Governor and Commander-in-Chief in, and upon, our said island of Bombay and of all our forts and forces raised and to be raised there for our service, either in the said island, or in any other island, or part of the firm land in the East Indies, which shall be either conquered by us, or be rendered and delivered up to us, until our further pleasure be known, and the commands of the same be otherwise disposed of by us.”²

Together with the commission of his appointment Sir Abraham Shipman received minute instructions to guide him in the discharge of his office.

1. You are, wind and weather permitting, to sail directly to our island of Bombay aforesaid.

2. [You are] to demand and receive the same with the artillery and ammunition, etc. into your possession from the Governor of our brother, the King of Portugal.

3. You are not to apply any of the provisions or pay of our forces for support of any [of] the inhabitants not in pay; but in all cases of their wants and straits, you are to dispose of them so (anything to the contrary notwithstanding) that our towns and forts in our said island may not be endangered thereby.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 126. ² Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 522.

4. Our main design in putting ourself to this great charge for making this addition to our dominions being to gain to our subjects free and better trade in the East Indies, you are with all convenient speed and advice to make use of the best ways and means for encouragement and invitation of our subjects and strangers to resort and trade there; and you are specially to give all manner of encouragement, help and assistance to the subjects of the King of Portugal in the East Indies, and to protect them as much as in you lies in their trade and navigation; you are also to keep a very good correspondence with the Vice-King of Goa and all other Portugal Governors, and likewise with the natives of the country, and to do all that can settle a trade amongst them.

5. You are to administer the oath of allegiance unto every person in the said island, capable by law to take the same.

6. You are principally to take care that drunkenness and debauchery be discountenanced and punished, and that none be admitted to any public trust or employment whose ill conversation may bring scandal thereupon; and that the Protestant religion, according to the profession and practice of the Church of England may have due reverence and exercise among them, the treaty made between us and our good brother, the King of Portugal, being nevertheless observed and kept inviolable.

7. You are for the defence of our said island and security of our good people to use all possible care and expedition for the completing of fortifications.

8. You are to give such encouragement (as securely you may) to such natives and others as shall submit to live peaceably under our obedience; and you are to suffer them to enjoy the exercise of their own religion without the least interruption or discountenance.

9. You shall from time to time give an account to us of the condition of our said island.

I think it will be necessary to give him very particular direction to keep a good correspondence with the Vice-King of Goa and all other Portugal Governors, and likewise with the natives of the country, and so do all he can to settle a trade among them. You know what instructions my Lord Marlborough has; but it will be very fit and necessary that the King write a letter to the Vice-King or Governor of that country under the Portuguese that this is the person to whom he has to deliver the island, the directions of the King of Portugal being that he should deliver it up to such person as the King of Great Britain should appoint to receive the same, in the same manner as you did for Tangier".¹

¹ Ibid., pp. 523-524.

These instructions were dated March 1662. In the manuscript it is added that the instruction under number 9 was written in Lord Chancellor's own hand. These instructions may help us to realise the source and origin of the subsequent dissensions between English and Portuguese. They indicate that the Authorities at home had no practical knowledge of Bombay, since mention is made of all 'the artillery and ammunition', supposed to be, forsooth! 'in our towns and forts on our said island'. They advocate principles of religious policy of which no Portuguese could approve: that the Protestant religion may have due reverence and exercise, and that Hindus and Muhammadans may enjoy the exercise of their religion without the least interruption and discountenance.

The Expeditionary Force consisted of 4 companies; each made up of 7 subordinate officers, two drummers and 100 privates, respectively commanded by 4 superior officers, one of whom, Sir Abraham Shipman, was at the same time Commander-in-Chief. This force was to be conveyed to Bombay by a squadron of Royal Navy under the command of the Earl of Marlborough.¹ Sir George Oxenden, who had been appointed 'President and Chief Director of all our affairs in Surat and all our factories in the north part of India (i.e. in the East Indies) from Ceylon to the Red Sea' accompanied the Expeditionary Force in one of the vessels of the Company, the *Richard and Martha*.² An other distinguished gentleman who sailed with the Royal Navy squadron, on the *Leopard*, commanded by Captain Richard Minors, was Antonio de Mello de Castro. He accompanied the English fleet by order of the King of Portugal as Governor or Viceroy of Goa to effect the transfer of Bombay island.³ The viceregal suite consisted of no less than eighty persons: doms, generalissimos, capitaos de infantaria, brigadeiros, fidalgos, illustrissimos senhores, and so on.

Marlborough's Arrival

The squadron sailed on the 6th April, 1662; but, the ships failing to keep company, Marlborough arrived off Bombay on the 18th September, 1662, while Sir Abraham Shipman reached about a fortnight later in the beginning of October.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 127-128. ² Ibid., p. 93. ³ Ibid., p. 219.

Immediately on his arrival off Bombay the Earl of Marlborough asked that the island should be handed over, either to himself or to Colonel John Hungerford, who was in command of one of the four companies of the Expeditionary Force, and who had arrived at Bombay together with the Earl of Marlborough, ahead of Sir Abraham Shipman. But Antonio de Mello de Castro refused to comply with this request, because neither of the above-mentioned gentlemen had been deputed by the King of England to take possession.

Nobody can deny that Antonio de Mello de Castro was thus far well within his right; nevertheless the delay was resented by the English. On the 26th September, 1662, the Earl of Marlborough wrote to Sir George Oxenden, who without touching Bombay had sailed straight to Surat from Johanna or Anjouan, one of the Comoro Islands, in Mozambique Channel, north-west of Madagascar.

"The 18th instant, we came to an anchor here. Not to trouble you or myself (who am not very well) with all the particulars, it shall suffice for the present to tell you that all the art or contest I could use could not persuade the surrender of this paltry island (most basely deserted to the Arabians last year) till the arrival of Sir Abraham Shipman; the cause pretended [was] want of sufficient power given to Col. Hungerford, in case of Sir Abraham's miscarriage or absence. Where the fault will light, I know not; the burthen and trouble will come most to my share for the present.¹

What made matters worse, was that other difficulties arose.

"I would have landed the soldiers to have here expected the arrival of Sir Abraham Shipman, but the soldiers, would not land without their arms; which is denied by the Viceroy; so as I am forced to take the soldiers on board again.²

Here again Antonio de Mello de Castro's conduct does not seem to be open to objection; for the landing of the armed soldiery would have put him at a singular disadvantage and practically at the mercy of the English who could easily have forced an issue.

The Earl of Marlborough had with him letters addressed to the Governors of India, Luiz de Mendoca Furtado and Pedro de

¹ Ibid., p. 131. ² Ibid., p. 132. ³ Ibid., p. 129.

Lancastre. But his hopes that these letters might settle matters did not materialise.

"And for so much that the Viceroy has declared that he cannot open the letters, directed to the Governors of India, I am resolved to go for Goa and deliver those letters; as also the rather for that our men fall sick in this road, neither can we can get anything worth the having for our money."¹

Add to all this that the Earl of Marlborough was not at all in good health.

"I would I were with you, or at least from hence, where I can neither eat nor drink."²

The English profited by their enforced leisure to get an exact knowledge of what was meant by the island of Bombay, and the result of their investigations added to their disappointment. On the 20th September, 1662, Captain Brown wrote:

"This time of our being here I have by order of our Admiral employed in sounding and discovering this island of Bombay; which was most strangely represented to His Majesty, our gracious King, with presumption that it contained from the bay to the north as far as the entrance of Bassein, as also to the east all Trombay, etc. to the said entrance; but we find it much contrary; for that space contains three islands distinctly, viz. Thana, the northermost (next to Bassein), which is the biggest; the next to that is Salsette, upon which is the harbour of Trombay, and is a good island; but the island of Bombay lies not more than ten miles north and south, and narrower east and west, and is about 22 miles in circuit, a fair channel parting it from Salsette, a draught of which I shall make bold to present to Your Worship, God sending me to see your face at Surat. I am heartily sorry to see our expectations so much shortened by this; but more that we are not likely peaceably to enter upon this, nor to land our soldiers in any equipage, through the pride of a perfidious Portugal."¹

In the above description there is a distinction made between Thana island and Salsette, whereas every schoolboy knows that Thana is situated in Salsette. But this is but a trifling matter compared to the significant conclusion of Captain Brown's letter: 'We are not likely to enter upon this [island] nor to land our soldiers in any equipage through the pride of a perfidious Portugal'. The leaven of national antipathy and racial distrust had evidently got mixed up with the meal of common sense, and the whole mass was

¹ Ibid. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 133.

rapidly being stirred. Captain Brown does not seem to have realised that thus far Antonio de Mello de Castro had done nothing to which the English could take exception; nor was de Castro in any way responsible for the geographical size of Bombay Island; and he does not seem to have had anything to do with the drawing up of the Treaty of 1661.

To what an extent the latent forces of dissension were raging like smouldering fires in the men who had come from England to take possession of Bombay, may be gathered from the interpretation of events by Gerald Aungier in a letter of the 26th September, 1662.

"His Lordship (the Earl of Marlborough) made a formal demand of the place, according to the articles, the same day we arrived. The Viceroy spent five days in consultation, and at last after many trivial and insignificant pretences his result [i.e. resolution] was this that his instructions out of Portugal ordered him not to surrender the place without His Majesty of England's immediate letter, confirmed by his own hand and seal."

"My Lord's next demand was that the soldiers in the interim might be received ashore; to which His Excellency's peremptory answer was that they might come ashore to refresh themselves, but without their arms; and [he] gave this for his reason that his men on board the *Leopard* [the viceregal suite of eighty members] were not suffered to wear their arms. This pretence (considering the miserable condition of the place and people, the weakness and malice of the argument, and the necessity of delivering the fort to us according to the articles) gave My Lord some disturbance.

"However being willing to lose no more time and to comply with the present conjuncture, he [the Earl of Marlborough] makes this proposal: 'that the Viceroy should assign to the Colonel and soldiers some convenient place and quarters sufficiently capable of such a number of men, wherein they might have room to exercise their arms; and that, in case any soldiers were taken out of the circuit with their arms about them, they might justly be punished as he [Antonio de Mello de Castro] thought good. To this My Lord has received yet no positive answer, though it be two days since he sent it; so that at present we cannot divine what the issue of this affair will be.

"But which gives him the greatest disturbance is that the place does not answer our King's expectation by four-fifths of what was represented to him; for by the draught which was delivered to His Majesty, Bombay, Salsette and Thana were included all in one island, and all under the name

and royalty of Bombay. But Captain Brown and myself, having sailed round this island, do find it far otherwise, being in extent scarce one-fifth part of the other two islands [Salsette and Thana are but one island]; and this is all the Portugals intend to surrender at last to us: which how it will be resented in England, I leave Your Worship's wisdom to conjecture."¹

Gerald Aungier's letter does not add much to our knowledge of facts regarding the events occurring at Bombay, but it enables us to gauge the feelings and thoughts of the Expeditionary Force—bitter thoughts and acrimonious feelings, choleric disappointment and vengeful resentment. As regards the words that were spoken on this occasion, either in council-chamber among the leaders, or in the ranks among the privates, a discreet silence is the most eloquent description. It may however be pointed out that the prevailing atmosphere was electrically surcharged with distrust: North and South had met, Teuton and Latin, Protestant and Catholic, and the meeting could have been more friendly.

Shipman's Arrival

The British ships, lying off Bombay, had perforce to wait for the arrival of the *Mary Rose* with Sir Abraham Shipman. That vessel was sighted early in October, and received a warm welcome as it drew near Bombay Island; for the Earl of Marlborough now thought that every procrastinating delay would quickly be put an end to. But he had counted without his host, Antonio de Mello de Castro, who meanwhile seems to have made up his mind to leave no stone unturned to impede the cession of Bombay. If Gerald Aungier's testimony is reliable, the Earl of Marlborough should have realised by this time that Antonio de Mello de Castro did not mean to surrender Bombay. In his letter of the 26th September, 1662, Gerald Aungier wrote:

Antonio de Mello de Castro declared "that his order was, though Sir Abraham Shipman were arrived with the King's letter, not to deliver possession before the monsoon were ended."²

This statement of Antonio de Mello de Castro is not found in the letters written either by the Earl of Marlborough or by

¹ Ibid., pp. 133-134. ² Ibid., p. 134.

Captain Brown. It has also to be borne in mind that this was written on the 26th September, when the monsoon had already come to an end. Aungier's testimony is therefore not altogether question-proof. But, if Antonio de Mello de Castro did say anything about the post-monsoon cession of Bombay, he was not warranted to do so by anything in the instructions he had received from his king.

"I, King, send you greeting. By the article of the contract which has been agreed on with the King of England, my good brother and cousin, concerning the dowry portion of the Queen, his wife, my most beloved and esteemed sister, which you will receive with this letter, you will understand why and how the port and country of Bombay relates to him, and the obligation I am under for directing the same to be delivered to him. Immediately as you arrive at the States of India, you will ask for the credentials from the King, by which you will know the person to whom the possession should be given and the delivery made. You will accordingly cause the same to be made in the manner and form of that capitulation, observing the same yourself, and causing the whole and every part thereof to be duly observed; and direct that the whole may be committed to writing very clearly and distinctly so as at all time to appear the whole that may pass in this affair. You will further send the same to me by different conveyances in order to settle and adjust the acquittance of the dowry promised to the King; and by the other articles of that treaty it will be present to you, the union we celebrated, and the obligation the King has to afford me succour in all my urgencies and necessity I may have. In any necessity you may find it convenient to apply to the English, you will do so; and at the same time you will assist them in the same way. King. Written at Lisbon, the 9th April, 1662."¹

These instructions make it clear that there exists no written authority for the post-monsoon cession of Bombay, of which no further mention is made in the documents.

When Sir Abraham Shipman presented his credentials, Antonio de Mello de Castro made a careful study of them, and to the astonishment and dismay of the English pronounced them to be defective. On the 5th of October Antonio de Mello de Castro in a letter to Sir Abraham pointed out the following defects:

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., 244.

"First of all, that the letter from His Serene Majesty of Great Britain is not subscribed by the Secretary of State as in Portugal the custom is (without which no business can be despatched). Secondly, Your Lordship's patent is not subscribed by the hand of His Most Serene Majesty of Great Britain, without which, according to the express laws of Portugal, it can have no force nor power, neither is to be obeyed by any. Yea, he is to be punished that gives obedience there unto. Thirdly, (which is of the greatest consequence) Your Lordship has not produced any procuration from His Most Serene Majesty of Great Britain, which ought to be inserted in the instrument to be made upon the surrender of the island as was so ordered by the instructions of the King, my Master; and since this is a special clause, upon supposition whereof the King, my Master, has ordered the delivery of the island, it not appearing, there is none can doubt that the power to make this surrender is not in me. Wherefore I desire Your Lordship to defer the receiving of actual possession until such time as a procuration of the Most Serene King of Great Britain may in due time be brought hither, which, being acknowledged by the Secretary of State at Lisbon, will easily dispel these doubts. In the meantime I do promise in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain to preserve this island to be hereafter delivered either to Your Lordship or any other who shall bring the prosecution, executed in the manner as is aforesaid; and upon this condition only I do constitute myself his Governor in the same manner as if I had been actually constituted by His Serene Majesty of Great Britain. And this is all I can do in this affair."¹

To sum up, Antonio de Mello de Castro found fault with Sir Abraham Shipman's credentials, because they were not signed either by the Secretary of State or by the King, and because the document was a private—whatever that may mean.

Foster thereupon remarks: "This was of course the merest chicanery";² an appreciation true to fact, and borne out by Antonio de Mello de Castro's letter of apology to his master, the King of Portugal.

On the 28th December, 1662, the Viceroy wrote from Goa:

"The reason for not surrendering the island was the same order which I had received from Your Majesty, and which I must obey; and as neither I nor the councillors understand it, it is necessary to report the very words written by Your Majesty on this matter, reminding that in case of doubt it was my duty to seek the sense most convenient for your service. The letter

¹ Foster F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 155-136. ² Ibid., p. 136.

says; As soon as you arrive at the State of India you shall demand the King's warrant,¹ and thereby you will know the person to whom the possession should be given and the delivery made.

"Abraham Shipman gave me, instead of the warrant which I asked for, a sealed letter written in Latin and letters patent in English. The letter had defects, as mentioned in the statement I ordered to be written and the letters patent had not the signature of the King of England. I doubted the validity of the one and the other, as all the letters patent I have ever seen had the royal signature; and there could be no more reason for the omission in this case than in my letter, which was signed. Is it the practice in England for the King to sign or not? If it is, how is it that the letters patent were not signed? If it is not, how was then the letter signed? Besides, I thought that there was a difference between the warrant and the missive letter. The letter is for one to whom it is addressed, the warrant is for the public. If royal persons do not write warrants as we do, they write instead letters patent, which are public and not private or missive letters. If I doubted, Sire, the letter which they call a warrant, how could I hand them over the place, as the conditions under which Your Majesty's instructions were given were wanting?"²

Antonio de Mello de Castro was well aware that all this was mere quibbling. Hence the greater part of his letter deals with additional reasons why Bombay should not be ceded. Thus for example he wrote to the King:

"The same letter from Your Majesty to me says:

"You will know the person to whom the possession should be given and the delivery made. You will accordingly cause the same to be made in the manner and form of that capitulation, observing the same yourself, and causing the whole and every part thereof to be duly observed."

"The secret chapter, which Your Majesty sent me, says that the King of England agrees to arrange peace between Your Majesty and the Dutch on honourable, advantageous and safe terms for Your Majesty; and in the event of the Dutch not agreeing to the terms, he will send such a fleet as will defend and protect the Portuguese possessions in India; and that his fleet shall be sent at the same time as the instructions for the handing over of Bombay are given.

¹ In the instructions to de Castro, as already quoted, the phrase used is *the credentials from the King*. This is da Cunha's translation. The same phrase is used in *Materials towards a Statistical Account of the Town and Island of Bombay*.

² Da Cunha, O. B., p. 246.

"If Your Majesty orders me to hand over Bombay, in accordance with the terms of the capitulations, it follows that I cannot hand it over in another form. The terms of the capitulations require that the King of England shall first arrange the treaty of peace; that the Dutch should first either agree to the terms or not, and continue the war; and that a sufficient fleet should be sent to help us in the latter case. Allow me, Your Majesty, to copy here the same words from the Latin which are more powerful than in Portuguese. *Qui si hujusmodi conditiones concedere recusaverint, tunc dictus Magnae Britanniae Rex, cum classem suam ad capiendam possessionem portus et Insulae Bombaym miserit, tales ac tantas copias simul mittet, instructas tam viribus quam mandatis, ut possint defendere, ac protegere omnes Lusitanorum possessiones in Indiis Orientalibus.*¹ So that the King of England cannot take possession of Bombay until after the treaty of peace is made or refused, and [tunc] then, which is the word exclusive of any other time, if peace is not made, he shall take possession and at the same time send the said fleet with the power and orders to defend us. If Your Majesty orders me to surrender in the mode and form of these capitulations and in no other manner, as said above, when the treaty of peace is neither accepted nor refused, and no fleet has arrived, except three ships, without either force or orders to help us, how can I account to Your Majesty for delivering the island of Bombay?²

The 'Secret Chapter' which Antonio de Mello de Castro here mentions is not among the published documents at the present writer's disposal. But the importance attached to it by Antonio de Mello de Castro in justifying the non-cession of Bombay clearly shows that the defects of Sir Abraham Shipman's credentials were imaginary rather than real.

Nor can it be said that the 'Secret Chapter' was the main motive that inspired the Viceroy when he refused to deliver the island. In his letter to the King of Portugal he pleads desperately for the retention of Bombay on religious, commercial and political grounds.

"Moreover I see the best port Your Majesty possesses in India, with which that of Lisbon is not to be compared, treated as of little value by the Portuguese themselves. I see in the island of Bombay so many Christian souls,

¹ The translation of this passage runs as follows :

In the event of the Dutch not agreeing to those terms, then the said King of Great Britain, when he will have sent his fleet to take possession of the port and island of Bombay, will at the same time send such troops well equipped and with duly given orders, so that they may be able to defend and to protect all the possessions of the Portuguese in the East Indies.

² Ibid., pp. 246-247.

which some day will be forced to change their religion by the English. How will they allow Catholics to reside in their territories when they hand over Catholics in the island of Anjuanne (Johanna Roads, Comora islands) to the Moors? I considered also that Your Majesty has no other place to receive and shelter Your Majesty's ships and the galleons of your fleet when that bar is closed. The English once there, and the island fortified, Your Majesty will lose all to the north, as they will take away all Your Majesty's trade. They bring the same articles as we do, and of better quality; they will compel all vessels to be put into that harbour, and lay duties, as we did formerly; we shall have to receive from them what Europe sought from us; even the provisions of our lands, which supply all our fortresses, we shall have to buy from them; because, giving one or two xerafins more for each mura of rice, they will gather all and sell afterwards for its weight in gold. Do not believe, Your Majesty, that it will be possible to prevent it; for no diligence will be enough, and that was the manner in which the Moguls have destroyed those lands, through which cause many persons have died from famine. It is yet possible to prevent them from taking away the provisions, for which I have left in those parts necessary instructions. But it is impossible in Bombay, because it is separated from Salsette by only a cannon-shot, and it would have to spend more in keeping watch than it would yield in revenue. Lastly, the criminals will find a shelter there; and if with the neighbourhood of the Moors they commit so many crimes, how daring will they be with that security?

"The English are at peace with us now, but what would it be in case of war? How can those islands which are the granaries of India, once wedged in between the British and the Mogores (Moguls), be defended? Who can prevent the natives from passing over; what drugs and merchandise will traders go to Goa in search of?

"I have shown how I have obeyed Your Majesty's orders by preserving the reputation of Your Majesty's arms, and prevented the total loss and destruction of Your Majesty's territories by not handing over Bombay."¹

This makes it plain that the supposed defectiveness of Sir Abraham Shipman's credentials and the Viceroy's appeal to the 'Secret Chapter' were little more than pretexts to give colour to Antonio de Mello de Castro's real design, the Portuguese retention of Bombay island. He even suggested that the King of England should be offered money to give up his claims.

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., pp. 247-248.

"As a remedy for all the aforesaid there is only one thing, and that is for Your Majesty to buy this island from the King of England. In another letter to Your Majesty, I say that Your Majesty can give from 200 to 300,000 cruzados [£25,000 to £37,500] in three years; now I say Your Majesty can give 500,000; 600,000, may even 1,000,000 cruzados [£62,500; 75,000; nay even 125,000].¹

It is therefore obvious that Antonio de Mello de Castro's fault finding with Sir Abraham Shipman's credentials is adequately commented upon by Foster when he tersely remarks: 'This was of course the merest chicanery.'

Meanwhile the English had realised that any further discussions with the Viceroy would serve no useful purpose. They therefore set sail, the Earl of Marlborough for Surat, and Sir Abraham Shipman to Goa, there to make a last attempt to come to a satisfactory understanding with the Portuguese. From a letter from the President and Council to the Company, dated the 30th November, 1662, it would seem that Antonio de Mello de Castro had suggested this course.

"Sir Abraham is gone down in the *Leopard* upon an expression the Viceroy used that they [he] could not make any surrender; but, if the Governors at Goa were willing, he would be contended."²

If Antonio de Mello de Castro ever dropped a hint to that effect, he did so in order to get rid of the English ships lying off Bombay, as is borne out by subsequent events. On his arrival at Goa, on the 10th October, 1662, Sir Abraham Shipman approached the old Governors, Luiz de Mendoca Furtado and Pedro de Lancastre, and after a tedious delay of twelve days received their written opinion that his credentials were sufficient warrant for complying with his request. This was an eminently satisfactory answer, with which Sir Abraham Shipman hastened back to Bombay, only to find that the Viceroy had either changed his mind, or had not been in earnest when suggesting that the old Governors should be asked for their opinion. No other choice was now left to Sir Abraham Shipman than to sail for Surat, as the Earl of Marlborough had done.

¹ Ibid., p. 248. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 137-138.

V The Great Grievance

Wheels Within Wheels

Thus far Antonio de Mello de Castro's ostensible reasons for not ceding Bombay have been dealt with. Probably, for the purpose of saving the Viceroy, other reasons were suggested both at Goa and at Lisbon.

Gary wrote from Goa on the 31st December, 1662:

"Bombay has not been delivered up by this new Viceroy, Antonio de Mello de Castro, though both the old Governors, viz. Luiz de Mendoca Furtado and Pedro de Lancastre, etc., councillors of this State [Goa] were clearly for it. But so far as I can understand by information received from many of the principalest fidalgos, with whom I converse daily, the reason that there was no surrender made for His Majesty's use was (they say) because My Lord of Marlborough did not assist them with the fleet under his command for the succour of Cochin, which at present is very straitly besieged by the Hollanders with 23 tall ships by sea and 5,000 men by land, who batter it from their several quarters night and day, they having attempted several times to take it by storm, but were always valiantly repulsed by the besieged, who have a most brave and gallant nobleman to their Governor, whose name is Ignacio Sarminto Carvalho, my extraordinary great friend."¹

At a later period, Thomas Maynard, English Consul at Lisbon, was shown by the Portuguese Secretary of State a paper containing the reasons given by the Viceroy for rejecting the English credentials. Firstly, the documents were clearly counterfeits, for the letter from King Charles had evidently been sealed only on the day of delivery, moreover, Marlborough's instructions referred to de Mello de Castro as Viceroy, though they were written nearly a month before he was appointed to that post. Secondly, Marlborough had refused to go to the aid of the Portuguese at Cochin, though assistance against the Dutch was as much a part of the treaty as the surrender of Bombay. Maynard could not say whether these reasons were really given by the Viceroy, or whether they were invented at Lisbon.²

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 141-142.

² Ibid., p. 135, note.

But neither the additional reasons given at Goa or Lisbon, nor the ostensible reasons, set forth by the Viceroy, played a predominant part in Antonio de Mello de Castro's way of acting. There was in addition to them, but carefully relegated to the background another motive of a personal character, which was in reality the mainspring of the Viceroy's opposition to the English. Antonio de Mello de Castro had been offended—grossly offended—and bitter discontent rankled in his heart. Of course in his official correspondence with his royal Master, the Viceroy could not bluntly put down that the main motive for not delivering Bombay was his own slighted dignity; but he did not fail to allude to it, so that it is not difficult to read between the lines whence the trouble really arose.

In the opening lines of the letter which he wrote to the King from Goa on the 28th December, 1661, Antonio de Mello de Castro complained bitterly of the many sufferings he had had to undergo:

"Sire, it is more on account of the duty of the post than from any need that I inform your Majesty of my sufferings in this voyage with the English, who will themselves make them known. For there were many who reproved the excesses of Captain Richard Minors, in whose company I come to this State. And General Marlborough continued them with greater harshness even in the Port of Bombay.

"From the report, sent with this letter, Your Majesty will be able to learn that not a day was passed without molestation, and I was sometimes warned that they wanted to kill all the Portuguese. Their senseless provocations might have well led us to use arms in revenge; but I contented myself with keeping them ready for defence. With more attention to Your Majesty's service than to my own life, I bore the risks and slights, expecting to send to Your Majesty my complaints. I hope that the world will see that my patience has not injured my reputation, but on the contrary has increased it for being in the service of Your Majesty, who knows to greatly appreciate it, as all my sufferings tend to Your Majesty's service.

"It did not appear convenient to hand over the island of Bombay, as the British refused me assistance every time I asked for it, and Marlborough went so far as to undeceive me not only by words, stating that the capitulations were formal (*modo geral*) and involved no obligations, but also by

actions, handing over wickedly to the Moors of Anjuanne [Johanna Island] 42 of Your Majesty's vassals, among whom there were 27 Christians, whom I had with me in the vessel. They did this in so barbarous manner and such indecency that they took from my arms a little child, which I had sheltered with the mother in my cabin, because three days before I had stood its godfather at the baptism."¹

The Johanna incident, here alluded to by Antonio de Mello de Castro, is briefly summarised by Foster. The squadron which conveyed the Expeditionary Force to Bombay consisted of five ships. One of them, the *Leopard*, commanded by Captain Richard Minors, was detailed for the conveyance of Antonio de Mello de Castro, and touched at Lisbon, where the new Viceroy, embarked. The ships failed to keep together, and at Johanna the *Dunkirk* and the *Leopard*, after waiting for a week for the missing vessels, were about to continue the voyage when an unfortunate incident occurred.

There had been trouble between the Portuguese and the people of Johanna; the latter, it was alleged, had robbed the Portuguese factory. Antonio de Mello de Castro profited by the presence of the two English ships to fill the ruler of the place with a wholesome fear, and to force upon him a compensatory settlement, which included the surrender of 42 natives, who were claimed as Portuguese subjects, and who were allowed to be taken on the *Leopard*. Matters being thus satisfactorily settled, the ruler of Johanna asked the Viceroy to give him a written acknowledgment that full satisfaction had been given to the Portuguese for the inflicted damage; but this the Viceroy would not do. Thereupon the Earl of Marlborough said that he would not consent to carry the rather undesirable passengers, unless Antonio de Mello de Castro gave the required formal receipt. But the latter proved obdurate, with the result that the blacks were set ashore again.² That their disembarkation was not effected without protest may be gathered from the Viceroy's statement that "they [the English] took from my arms a little child, which I had sheltered with the mother in my cabin, because three days before I had stood its godfather at the baptism."

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., p. 245, ² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 149-150.

The following account of the Johanna incident is taken from a letter written by Arnold Brown to a person in England, and is dated: In the Road of Bombay, Ship *Dunkirk*, 20th September, 1662:

"Just as we were sailing, happened a difference between the Portugal Governor and our Admiral concerning some fifty blacks that, with our Admiral's leave, he had taken aboard the *Leopard* with him, upon condition he should give a discharge to the people upon the Island under his hand for the said people, etc. pretences, which he, not having done to that time, I was sent aboard to demand it of him; upon which demand he seemed averse to give any receipt or discharge to the people of the Island, pretending that they had robbed their factory, etc., as they said when Your Worship was there; yet could prove nothing in all that time, though desired to do it both by the King of the Island and our Admiral; but upon farther treaty with him, he caused the Vereador de fazenda to give an ordinary receipt for the people, not mentioning anything of indemnity to the people of the island, neither would he sign the receipt himself, but only gave his Vereador's hand for it. So I, not being able to get more, took the same, and presented to our Admiral: and when he had read it, thought it not at all reasonable in relation to the country-people nor ourselves; therefore he forthwith wrote to the Governor to give a satisfactory discharge under his own hand to the people of Johanna, or else all the aforesaid blacks to be turned ashore again. With the letter Mr. Aungier, Captain Minors and myself went to the Governor; and he utterly refused to give any other discharge; so by order from our Admiral to Captain Minors all the blacks were set ashore again."¹

This affront was deeply resented by the Viceroy who had other grievances, besides. As Foster pointedly remarks: "It may well be supposed that de Mello de Castro, considering the rank and dignity of his office, expected that he would be treated with as much deference as if he were conveyed to his post, as usual, in a Portuguese galleon. No special instructions appear to have been given to Minors on this point; and to him, probably, the Viceroy and his suite of eighty persons were simply troublesome passengers with far too exalted ideas of their importance."²

To put it mildly, it would seem that Captain Richard Minors was not a very tactful person. He did not foresee that the day would come when Antonio de Mello de Castro would pay him

¹ Missing Papers, Vol. I. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 130, note.

back in the same coin; for when the Earl of Marlborough requested that the soldiers might be permitted to come ashore on Bombay Island, the Governor replied that they might do so to refresh themselves, but without their arms; and he gave this for his reason that his men on board the *Leopard* were not suffered to wear arms.

A graphic description of what took place on the *Leopard* is supplied by Henry Gary, who on the 31st December, wrote from Goa to London:

"But I find by discussing with the Vice-King himself that he is very much disaffected to our nation in general and extremely to Captain Richard Minors in particular, pretending not only to have received ill-usage from him, whilst he was on board His Majesty's ship the *Leopard*, but so long as he was in her, he was afraid of his life, having been told by somebody in the ship that the Captain threatened to cut off his head. That there happened several differences in the term of the voyage between him [the Viceroy] and the ship's company, I heard long before my departure to Surat. But I am very confident that Captain Minors is so civil and discreet a person that he would never utter any such speeches or use any menaces as the Viceroy said he did; though I believe that there have not been those wanting on board to do many bad offices between them, specially one Anthony Archer, master of the ship, a very drunken and dissolute man, who most part of the voyage from England did on several occasions insinuate many things unto the Viceroy, telling him all that ever he heard the Captain say and many things else of his own capricio and fancy: for which unworthiness, in my poor judgement, he deserves to be severely punished. I had not said much of their passage, were it not for that I heard the Viceroy say that he would write a letter of complaint against Captain Minors unto His Majesty, concluding his discourse at that time thus, in his own language: "Sabera o Capt. Minors que eu sou vassale del Roy de Portugal, e nao estou escravo: Captain Minors shall know that I am the King of Portugal's subject and not outlawed."¹

Antonio de Mello de Castro's fears for his life may sound absurd to British ears. But it must be borne in mind that the Viceroy's fanciful and morbid turn of mind, further exercised by the Johanna incident and the lack of deference shown to him, acted like an anaesthetic deadening the dictates of reason, so that embittered feelings, unbridled and unchecked, became his sole guidance.

¹ Ibid., p. 142.

Gradually he evolved the design to leave no means untried to set at naught the Treaty, which his royal Master had made with the English King; and once that he was out of the hands of those who had so grievously affronted and so senselessly threatened him, he carried out his plan even more successfully than he expected. Thus it comes about that Antonio de Mello de Castro, and he alone, was responsible for the non-cession of Bombay.

The interpretation of historical facts does not encourage idle speculation on might-have-beens; yet in the present instance, what we know of Antonio de Mello de Castro—his quibbling, his obstinacy, his recourse to every excogitable motive, religious, commercial and political, his utter disregard of the existing Treaty—all this warrants the surmise that, if the English had treated the Viceroy, not as they did, but with that deference and ceremonial to which his viceregal dignity entitled him among his countrymen, he would have acted differently, and Bombay would have been ceded to the English on their arrival in Bombay in September 1662.

To what extent Antonio de Mello de Castro resented the slights he had to put up with, may be gathered from the following letter, written to the Queen of England and dated Bassein the 3rd December, 1662:

“Because it is certain that Marlborough and the English of his company (to excuse themselves of the ill-using they did me in this voyage) will tell in England more than they ought, or what has happened, I am necessitated to give Your Majesty an account of their excesses and my own sufferings (for they could not use myself and the rest of the Portuguese worse); which they did with such scorn to our nation that Your Majesty is obliged to cause that the public news of their punishments may serve for an example hereafter; and since Your Majesty knows me, you may believe that I shall say nothing in this paper, but what I shall be able to show authentically, and of which Your Majesty may be informed by the persons of the ship wherein I came; for, though they be of another belief than ours, yet they will speak truth, if they are not hindered by their fear of Marlborough, who did not only approve of the robberies and affronts of Captain Richard Minors, but also increased the cause of my complaint, using me worse than if they were Hollanders, and with less civility than if I were a blackamoor, like those they tie by the legs in the Indies. I bore my life with fears, not being only

threatened by the common insolence, but also by the power of General Marlborough, Captain Minors assuring me that they would cut off my head for having made the protests and requests, which was [were] convenient to the service of the King, my Master; and they denied me the succour that the most Serene King of England obliged himself by the capitulations of peace to give us, which I have all along with me. For in the island of St. Lawrence the blackamoors, in that of Anjuanne [Johanna] the Moors, and in Cochin the Hollanders were more friendly with General Marlborough and the English Captains than the Portuguese of said islands. I being sutt [shut?] in the Indies and surrounded, the said General would give me no favour or help at all. This his unreasonableness, and the not bringing with him a procuration from the King of England (like one that came upon the business of Persia, and not upon the engagements of Portugal) was the reason why the island of Bombay was not delivered him. I hope that Your Majesty (as a good Catholic and Portuguese) will be pleased to see my protests and letters, which side General Marlborough carries with him; and I assure myself that Your Majesty will judge I have complied with my obligation, and also because I am now ready to deliver up [the] said island (as the King, my Master, commands me) unto what person soever shows me the Most Serene King of England's commission to receive the same and satisfies the conditions of the agreement.

The master of the ship *Leopard*, who carried me from Portugal to the Indies, is the only man amongst all that helped us; wherefore I ought to desire Your Majesty in the name of the King, my Master, to honour and favour him; and I shall receive it as a great one, if in the first navy that sets out, Your Majesty would make him a captain of a ship, and that Your Majesty would be pleased to command me (in these parts) in your royal service, which I shall observe with that love, respect and zeal whereunto I am obliged. Our Lord preserve Your Majesty."¹

Antonio de Mello de Castro likewise wrote to the King of England, the letter being dated, as the preceding one, Bassein, 3rd December:

"I am necessitated to make my complaint unto Your Majesty upon the late proceedings of Captain Richard Minors and afterwards of General Marlborough's towards me, which raised to such a great excess that all respect was lost, and our lives endangered. By two papers that both carry, signed by me, Your Majesty will see my sufferings and true meaning; they (I trust) will tell Your Majesty yet more than I say; and seeing I came embarked under Your Majesty's protection and royal word, the wrong that was done

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., pp. 443-444.

me runs upon your account; wherefore it is but justice I should expect of Royal Greatness the satisfaction thereof; and seeing I did not deliver the island of Bombay for want of a procuration from Your Majesty, and likewise because they would never succour me (it being an obligation by the agreement), and the necessity being so great, I believed that Your Majesty (as so just a Prince) would have laid the punishment upon the offender, and have thought I had done my obligation (being pleased to consider) how much a subject of honour ought to contribute to the King's service.

The master of the ship *Leopard*, who came in my company, has been the only person that used us well; for which reason I find myself obliged to give Your Majesty this account, as I will, to the King, my Master, desiring His Majesty to do the said captain [master] honour and favour; and I should receive a great one, if in your fleet that Your Majesty send next to Bombay, I might see him a captain of a ship. And though not concerning myself for all the subjects Your Majesty has, yet it shall appear how much inclined I am unto Your Majesty's service, having been one of Your Majesty's soldiers (when even your own subjects were in rebellion against you), in company of Prince Robert, of whom Your Majesty may inform yourself with how much love (at that time) I served Your Majesty, which this day is much increased with that I owe unto the Most Serene Queen, our Infanta, in whose company Our Lord preserve Your Majesty many happy years."¹

The Portuguese Viceroy's letter to the Queen was not likely to produce the good results expected by its writer. On the 16th May, 1663, Samuel Pepys, commenting on the non-cession of Bombay remarks: "Which [non-delivery] the King takes highly ill"; and he adds significantly: "and I fear our Queen will fare the worse for it."²

In the light of after-events it may be inferred from these words that the King was not an ideal husband. "On the 20th January, 1664, about eight months later, Pepys writes: "Mr. Pierce tells me that my Lady Castlemain is not at all set by, by the King; but that he does dote upon Mrs. Stewart only, and, that, to the leaving of all business in the world and to the open slighting of the Queen."

Apart from this, Antonio de Mello de Castro in his letter to the Queen and in that to the King, makes mention and speaks highly of the master of the ship *Leopard*, and even asks that he

¹ Ibid., p. 445. ² Pepys, *The Diary*, Vol., p. 421

should made a captain. The question naturally offers whether this gentleman is the same person of whom Henry Gary said that he was a very drunken and dissolute man, who most part of the voyage from England did on many occasions insinuate many things unto the Viceroy, telling all that ever he heard the Captain say, and many things else of his own capricio? There is every likelihood that the same person is both praised and blamed; which makes it all the more difficult to come to a correct knowledge of what occurred.

What forces itself on the mind of the reader is that Antonio de Mello de Castro was mainly swayed by personal motives, when he refused to hand over Bombay Island to Sir Abraham Shipman.

VI The Padres

Scapegoats

The non-cession of Bombay by Antonio de Mello de Castro filled the English with indignation; they held the Portuguese in general responsible for the trespasses of one individual, Antonio de Mello de Castro; and letting their feelings run away with them they pitched upon the Catholic Padres as scapegoats, a course of action which is easily accounted for, when it is borne in mind that those Padres were Jesuits, and that the very name of Jesuit stank in the nostrils of every Protestant Englishman.

Accusations

On the 8th December, 1662, the Surat Council wrote to the Company:

"My Lord [the Earl of Marlborough] with Sir Abraham not prevailing upon the Viceroy and the more eminent inhabitants and owners of the island of Bombay, etc. (who indeed are the Jesuits more particularly and principally, [considering the island] as a place fittest for them to own and be owners of in respect of its fruitfulness and pleasantness), Sir Abraham resolved for Goa."¹

The literal interpretation of this extract implies that Marlborough and Shipman pleaded their cause, not only with the Viceroy, but also with the more important inhabitants and owners of Bombay Island, among whom the Jesuits stood in the first place. But this is an altogether unwarranted statement, and there is nothing in Marlborough's letters or in Shipman's account to suggest that either of them ever interviewed the inhabitants of Bombay Island.

It may well be surmised, without incurring the stigma of giving way to day-dreaming instead of dealing with historical facts, that, after he had landed in Bombay Island, Antonio de Mello de Castro told to an interested audience of Portuguese officials and of

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 139.

the principal landowners—among whom there may have been one Jesuit Padre—what had occurred on the outward voyage: the prohibition to his men to wear arms on board, the Johanna troubles with the forcible removal of his god-child and its mother from the shelter of the Viceregal cabin, the slights and affronts suffered by him and the threats to kill him. It was an absorbing tale, punctuated by many an exclamation, enlivened with passionate gesticulation, and told in a rushing torrent of swift flowing words that swept his hearers off their feet, and made them one with the speaker, one in feeling, in bitter resentment, in outraged dignity, and one in their approval of his plan to try his utmost to impede the cession of Bombay Island.

Accordingly it would be a strange mistake indeed to aver that the Portuguese officials and the inhabitants of Bombay persuaded the Viceroy not to deliver up Bombay. Antonio de Mello de Castro needed no persuading to that effect; he had fully made up his mind to do so on his own account; and to try to account for the Viceroy's opposition by alleging local pressure, as Foster does, shows a singular lack of psychological insight, and ignores the Viceroy's many grievances and his threat that 'Captain Minors shall know that I am the King of Portugal's subject and not a slave'.

Furthermore, from the letter written by the Surat Council one would surmise that there were a number of Jesuits in Bombay Island, since they are mentioned among the more important inhabitants and landowners of the island. Perhaps it may come as a surprise to many that the Jesuits were absentee landlords; there was no Jesuit convent, nor college, nor school on Bombay Island; at most was there a *pied-a-terre* for the Jesuit Father in charge of the Parel property.

Father Hull thus comments on the missionary activities of the Jesuits in Bombay Island about the year 1661: "Our chief question, however, is whether the Jesuits took any part in missionary work of Bombay Island. The possession of a chapel at Parel (which they took over from the Franciscans) would so far suggest that they did—at least to the extent of working for the conversion of

the natives living on their estates. In confirmation we find in the catalogue of 1653 the name of a Father who is entitled 'Vicar and Procurator of the lands at Parel of the Agra College, and again in 1678 another Father called 'Vicar of Parel and Procurator of the Mogul.' The Vicar is likewise alluded to in the Government papers of 1676 as 'that Jesuit Padre at Parel'.¹ He was, however, still reckoned as one of the members of the Bandra College; and we have no means of knowing whether he resided generally at Parel, or whether he only visited the estates from time to time. One thing at least is certain. He was a single individual missionary living out of his proper 'residence' (which was Bandra), so that the Jesuit college, monastery, or convent of Parel sometimes mentioned is nothing but a myth. There was at most at Parel a parochial house, attached to the old chapel and occupied by one Jesuit Priest—and that is all. Hence with the exception of some work done by this one Jesuit within the estates, of which he had the temporal care, the whole credit of conversion of Bombay during Portuguese times seems to be due to the Franciscans alone—and it is in their archives and not in those of the Society that the early Church History of Bombay Island is to be found.²

Elsewhere Father Hull remarks: "A Franciscan chapel was built at some early date. Later on the estate on which the church stood and the church itself passed into the hands of the Jesuits of Bandra, some time before 1653, and probably about 1620. When the Jesuit property was finally confiscated in 1719, the chapel lay unused for some time, but afterwards was utilised with large additions as part of Government house. The chapel still remains embodied in the building, which was recently turned into a Government laboratory and is now used for scientific purposes. The designation of the chapel is unknown."³

There is no historical document extant to substantiate Father Hull's statement that "the chapel of the Franciscans passed into Jesuit hands." Fryer, who visited Bombay in 1675, states:

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I, p. 62. ² Hull, B. M. H., Vol. I, pp. 17-18.

³ Ibid, pp. 15-16.

"Here [at Mazagon] the Portugals have another church belonging to the Franciscans. Beyond it [Mazagon] is Parel, where they [the Portugals] have another church and demesnes belonging to the Jesuits, to which appertains Siam [Sion], manured by Columbeens [Kunbis], husbandmen."¹

Fryer makes a clear distinction between the Parel church and the Jesuit property; and he does not say that the church belonged to the Jesuits. There is hardly any doubt possible that at one time the church was looked after by the Franciscans. It may of course be supposed, as is done by Father Hull, that the Franciscan church was handed over to the Jesuits, though it continued to be called the Franciscan church. Another possible inference is that in 1675 the Franciscans, and not the Jesuits, were in charge of the Parel church, contrary to Father Hull's assertion. Nor does the entry into the Jesuit catalogue of 1653, where a Father's name is mentioned as Vicar and Procurator of the lands at Parel, imply that the said Father was in charge of the Parel chapel. His title of Vicar is sufficiently explained by his having to look after the spiritual welfare of the natives on the estate.

In any case, whoever may have been the Vicar of the church of Parel, there is no denying that, with the exception of the Jesuit care-taker, there were no other Jesuits on the island. Yet the Surat Council do not hesitate to affirm that the Jesuits are among the more eminent inhabitants and owners of the island. They owned considerably landed property, but were absentee landlords. Hence the idea that Marlborough and Shipman should have interviewed the Jesuits on Bombay Island is but an allegation and an absurd allegation, to boot.

Before dismissing the accusation of the Surat Council against the Jesuits, attention may be called to the clairvoyance of the Surat Authorities. The very thoughts of the Jesuits were, forsooth! known to the Surat Council; and the Jesuits are said to have opposed the cession of Bombay [considering the island] as a place fittest for them to own and be owners of in respect of its fruitfulness.

¹ Fryer, E. I. P., p. 67.

This way of writing reminds one of the old Persian chroniclers, who seem always to have known the exact thoughts and words of a king or a general at the moment he gave the signal for the combat to begin. Like the Persian chroniclers the Surat Council seem rather to have overreached themselves.

A slightly different account of Antonio de Mello de Castro's course of action is suggested by Captain Brown in a letter of the 20th September, 1662. According to Captain Brown the Viceroy told the Earl of Marlborough that he would speak with the Governors of the adjacent places",¹ meaning probably the Portuguese Authorities at Bassein and in Salsette. There is no historical evidence to prove that the Jesuits were invited to assist at those consultations. Whether the Jesuits were present, or not, it has to be borne in mind that at those meetings Antonio de Mello de Castro was the chief speaker: he recounted his grievances, he made known his plan not to cede Bombay, and his proposal met with the approval of his audience. The Viceroy was not persuaded by the Portuguese Authorities in Bassein and Salsette, on the contrary he himself did all the persuading.

A second edition of the Surat Council's accusation is to be found in a letter of one of its members, Henry Gary, who had proceeded to Goa probably to assist Sir Abraham Shipman in his negotiations with the old Governors, Luiz de Mendoca Furtado and Pedro de Lancastre, to obtain the cession of Bombay. As is usual with second editions, this one was amended, and the information was brought up to date.

In a letter of the 31st December, 1662, Henry Gary wrote:

"It is most certain and, therefore, not to be questioned that the Jesuits of Bandra (a place near adjacent to Bombay) and the fidalgos of Bogain (or Rassin) [Bassein] have carried a great stroke with Antonio de Mello de Castro in dissuading him to deliver up Bombay for His Majesty's use, they being timorous that His said Majesty, through his vicinity to them, might in a short space of time make himself master of the said places, which with Karanja (an island in Bombay, lying southerly) are the most beneficent places belonging to the King of Portugal."²

Ten days later on the 10th January, 1663, Sir Abraham Shipman wrote to Sir William Morice, Secretary of State:

"The Jesuits are the men that govern here and are owners of Salsette, the island most adjoining to Bombay; which was the cause that we were not admitted to it; for they feared that if we had that [Bombay], their island [Salsette] with the rest would soon fall into our hands. Bombay and the islands lying between [it and] Bassein are the most fruitful of all India."¹

There is a striking similarity between the indictment against the Jesuits by Henry Gary and that by Sir Abraham. Their accusation differs from that of the Surat Council. They do not state that the Jesuits were among the more important inhabitants and landowners of Bombay. Perhaps they had learned by that time that the Jesuits had no residence, no school, no monastery in Bombay Island. Nor do they say that Sir Abraham Shipman ever approached the Jesuits of Bombay. The scene of the supposed Jesuit political intrigue is now shifted to Bandra, where they are said to govern, so that they have carried a great stroke with Antonio de Mello de Castro in dissuading him from delivering up Bombay. But, as has already been pointed out, the Viceroy needed no persuading to this effect; and both Henry Gary and Sir Abraham Shipman are eloquent witnesses thereof. Henry Gary has left on record a detailed account of the Viceroy's grievances, of his dislike of the English, and of his intention to show Captain Minors that he—Antonio de Mello de Castro—was the King of Portugal's subject and not his slave. (See Gray's letter of the 31st December already quoted). As regards Sir Abraham Shipman, he wrote to the Secretary of State:

"I have since tried him [Antonio de Mello de Castro] again by another letter, but find him more obstinate than formerly. I find the Viceroy to be an utter enemy to the English nation, and I am confident [he] shall do nothing in the business of Bombay, although you should receive orders from Portugal."²

It would be difficult to state more forcibly the present writer's main contention that the Viceroy was alone responsible for the non-cession of Bombay; which can be adequately accounted for

¹ Ibid., p. 216. ² Ibid.

without dragging in the Jesuits at all. Again both Henry Gary and Sir Abraham Shipman posed as thought-readers. They seem to have been gifted with the same clairvoyance as the Surat Council, they knew exactly what the Jesuits thought, and why they did so. Would it be a rash judgment to insinuate that their fanciful imaginings were largely due to environment; they lived in an anti-Jesuitical atmosphere, and the microbe of distrust had got into their system. This alone can explain Sir Abraham's gratuitous allegation: The Jesuits are the men that govern here. This alone accounts for the preposterous statement the Jesuits 'are owners of Salsette, which is the island most adjoining to Bombay'. The Jesuits had considerable landed property in Salsette, notably the famous Bandra College; but they were not the only landlords.

Henry Gary

Though Henry Gary should have known better, he reiterated his accusation against the Jesuits in a letter of the 12th January, 1663, wherein he added that the Jesuits of Bandra bribed the Viceroy to withhold Bombay, and gave him 40,000 Xerafins.¹

Unfortunately Foster does not give this second letter, so that it has been impossible to ascertain whether in that letter the Jesuits of Bandra and the fidalgos of Bassein, or the Jesuits alone are spending good money uselessly; since the Viceroy had already made up his mind not to hand over the island for reasons which have already been given.

Yet Gary's accusation cannot simply be discarded on the score that the Jesuits' bribe was not needed; and the question naturally offers: Should credence be given to Gary's statement? Our answer is as follows: Henry Gary is the only person who brings forward the charge of bribery against the Jesuits. Neither Shipman nor Marlborough, nor the Surat Council do so. Consequently this is a case in which everything depends on the veracity of the witness; and, unfortunately, Henry Gary does not seem to have entertained those high sentiments of honour, which make a true gentleman

¹ Ibid., p. 143.

abhor using unfair means even for the sake of an advantage he might obtain thereby.

When it served his purpose, Henry Gary, on another occasion, made no bones of having recourse to trickery and deceit; and in his own words he stands convicted of forgery. But a forger may also be a liar; or to put it otherwise: if a man guilty of forgery is the only witness against another party, whose innocence must be presumed till his guilt is brought home to him, then the forger's statement assumes the character of a mere allegation.

But was Henry Gary a forger? In a letter from Goa, dated the 17th March, 1663, he informs Lord Marlborough that he had left no means untried to induce the Viceroy to deliver up Bombay Island to Shipman. On the 3rd March, having received a letter from Captain Minors at Cochin, which declared that, if the English left Angediva, the Dutch would at once occupy the island, he took it to the Viceroy:

"Having previously made a small addition of my own to the letter (imitating his [Minors'] hand as well as I could) that the Dutch were making preparation to pass for Bombay, hoping that that would serve as a spur to put him forward to the accomplishment of what himself and his Council had so many days before determined to put in practice."¹

In the past and in the present the Jesuits have been often accused of acting on the principle that the end justifies the means, an accusation which the Jesuits have always asked their enemies to substantiate, but have asked so in vain. By a dire mockery of fate it is not the Jesuits, but one of their enemies that stands here accused and convicted of believing in, and acting on, the principle that the end justifies the means.

However, Henry Gary's forgery might be, if not condoned, at least relegated to the background; and his veracity might not on that account be doubted, if he were a friend of the Jesuits, or at least a disinterested witness. But the truth is that he hated the Jesuits cordially and gave expression to his hatred in terms of weird medieval imagery. In 1667 Gary expressed his confidence that the

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

revenue of Bombay would be steadily increased, provided that "those caterpillars, the Jesuits, be not re-admitted."¹ Elsewhere he speaks of the Jesuits "that wear the livery of peace, yet are the greatest *boute-feu* [fire-brands] of the world."² In the light of these unflattering aspersions, caterpillars and *boute-feu*, we do not see how any serious historian can possibly forget that Captain Henry Gary, who accuses the Jesuits of bribery, is guilty of forgery and an unreliable witness.

By way of conclusion, the accusations against the Jesuits may be summed up in the words of Hamilton: "They [the English] arrived at Bombay in September 1662. But the Church withstood the Crown and disobeyed the order. Nor would they [the Church] acknowledge the Viceroy, unless he would come into their measures, which rather than lose his new dignity, he did."³

This account is as short as it is misleading, and is inadmissible in the light of the historical facts, of which Hamilton seems to have been in complete ignorance.

¹ Ibid., p. 309. ² Ibid., p. 304. ³ Hamilton, N. A. E. I., Vol. I, p. 106.

VII The Angediva Tragedy

Angediva Island

The Island of Angediva is situated about 51 miles south-east of Goa, along the coast of North-Canara, from which it is separated by a strait two miles broad. Irregular in form, the island is nearly three miles long from north to south, and less than a mile broad from west to east, its surface being under two square miles. Its western sea-board is rocky and barren, but further inland there are groves of coco-nut trees and rice fields.

On the occasion of his first voyage home, Vasco de Gama, after a rather hurried departure from Calicut, sailed along the coast, and sighted the island of Angediva, where the Portuguese landed, and, as Gaspar Correa tells us, "enjoyed themselves much." This was in 1498. One of the officers, Nicolau Coelho, has left on record that there were several good water surrounded with trees, and that there was a tank, the water of which was conveyed by an aqueduct close to the shore apparently for the convenience of ships. This information was communicated to Portuguese sea-captains, and Angediva became a favourite halting place, where the Portuguese ships took in a fresh supply of wood and water.

Afterwards the Portuguese transformed Angediva into an island-fortress; but scarcely had the rather primitive walls of clay and stone been completed when the garrison, left behind at Angediva, was attacked by a number of Muhammadans and Hindus, subjects of the King of Goa.

The leader of the assailants was a man who had changed his name, his creed and his avocation in life; and from Antonio Fernandes, a Catholic and a carpenter, he had become Abdulla, a Muhammadan and a soldier. As a military leader Abdulla did not distinguish himself at Angediva, for the attack was warded off; and as the besieged had been able to send news of their plight to their countrymen, the besiegers, dreading the arrival of

Portuguese reinforcements, raised the siege and hastened across the strait to the continent as precipitately as they had landed in the island.

The Portuguese realised that, because of its isolated position, Angediva would not be left long in peace. Accordingly it was determined not to expose a small garrison to the risk of being exterminated by superior enemy forces. The fortifications were razed to the ground, and in 1506 the island was abandoned by the Portuguese, though the latter still considered it Portuguese territory. In 1682 the Portuguese made another attempt at fortifying the island. In the long interval between the years 1506 and 1682 the most important event in the annals of Angediva history was the landing on its barren shores of the Expeditionary Force, which had been sent by the King of England to take possession of Bombay.¹

Landing at Angediva

In a letter dated the 26th September, 1662, the Earl of Marlborough had informed Sir George Oxenden that the Viceroy, Antonio de Mello de Castro, had refused to deliver Bombay as long as Sir Abraham Shipman had not arrived. This news filled the President and Council at Surat with misgivings. Sir Abraham might not reach Bombay for many a day; there was even a possibility of his never arriving at all; for nobody knew what had become of the *Mary Rose*. Had the good ship been disabled and delayed? Had she perished with all on board? Who could tell? Meanwhile the President and Surat Council were faced with the possibility of the Expeditionary Force coming to Surat, where their arrival would be rather a source of trouble. The President and Council of Surat wrote to the Earl of Marlborough.

"These people could and did acquaint us, two or three days before your letter arrived, what passes betwixt Your Lordship and those peoples, and

¹ Those details about the island of Angediva are taken from: *An Historical and Archaeological Sketch of the Island of Angediva* by J. Gerson Da Cunha in the Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume XI, 1875, pp. 288-310.

of their refusing you to land your soldiers; wherefore some jealousies [i.e. suspicions] were started to this Governor [of Surat] that you might probably be inclined to bring them hither; which has given us some trouble (it being aggravated by the King's death); but we have at present pacified him and the rest of the King's ministers here in town that you were not, nor would not bring them hither. For, if any such thing should be, you may certainly conclude all our business will be obstructed here; for we cannot expect other than a seizure and stop upon the Company's goods and estate here, [so] that we shall not be able to send one ship home; which we beseech Your Honour to take into serious consideration."¹

Thus the President and Council of Surat gave the Earl of Marlborough clearly to understand that they deprecated his coming to that city. Nevertheless, when the Viceroy, Antonio de Mello de Castro, refused to surrender Bombay to the Expeditionary Force, the Earl of Marlborough sailed for Surat with the *Dunkirk* and the *Mary Rose*, which carried the soldiers. He arrived at Suvali, the historic sea-port of Surat, on the 10th October, 1662.

It would seem that by that time the Earl had made up his mind not to be any further implicated in the troubles that were likely to arise. Perhaps the plain-spoken letter of the Surat President and Council may have helped him to come to this determination. Anyway, on this arrival at Suvali, the Earl, realising that he was king on board his ship, whilst his authority would be questioned on land, refused to leave his ship. In a Surat letter it is mentioned.

"But the dissatisfaction His Lordship received at Bombay by the Vice-King has wrought upon him so passionately that he came thence directly to Suvali, whence he is resolved not to stir, no, not out of his ship (though all possible persuasions have most urgently been used), but waits the season for his return to Europe again."²

In the light of after-events it cannot be denied that the Earl of Marlborough was a wise man.

It should be noted that the opening statement in the above quoted extract is not quite correct. The Earl did not come to Surat, 'because the dissatisfaction received at Bombay from the

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 105. ² Ibid., p. 108.

Vice-King wrought upon him so passionately'. He patiently awaited Sir Abraham Shipman's arrival; and it was only when Antonio de Mello de Castro had found fault with Sir Abraham's credentials that the leaders of the Expeditionary Force realised that nothing could be gained by lying off Bombay. Accordingly the Earl of Marlborough then—and not before—sailed for Surat, whilst Abraham Shipman in the *Leopard* made for Goa there to plead his cause. In Goa the Governors decided in his favour, whereupon he hastened back to Bombay only to find the Viceroy as obdurate as before in his decision not to cede Bombay. Then Sir Abraham Shipman had no alternative left to him but to join the Earl of Marlborough at Surat. The great problem now was what to do with the soldiers of the Expeditionary Force.

"He [Sir Abraham Shipman] is also come up hither, where great debates have been, among the rest, the attempting Danda Rajpuri; but they were no way willing to it, nor could they be persuaded. The reasons you will better understand at home. The next was how to dispose of the men in this their disappointment. That of transporting them to Mauritius and English Forest (alias the island of Dom Maskarinous [Reunion] appeared to them as casting them away."¹

It is obvious that the Surat Factors wanted to get rid as soon as possible of the Expeditionary Force. It has been suggested that they could not help doing. 'They made an application to the English President, Sir George Oxenden, to obtain permission from the Mogul, to effect a landing of the troops there; but even this was refused."²

A similar account is given by Hamilton:

"The English fleet was forced to go to Suvali to land their men and get refreshments; but the Governor of Surat, in whose district Suvali is, grew jealous of the numbers and bravery of the English, and threatened the Factory established at Surat, if they did not speedily re-embark; which, to avoid suspicion, they did."³

Nevertheless the question presents itself whether the departure from Suvali was not engineered by the Surat Authorities, who

¹ Ibid., p. 139. ² Da Cunha, H. A. I. A., p. 308.

³ Hamilton, N. A. E. I., Vol. I., p. 106.

were not at all anxious to have a force of over 400 men billeted on them. Sir Abraham Shipman seems to have been of opinion that the Surat President and Council, had they wished to do so, could have given accommodation to his soldiers. On the 26th January, 1663, Sir Abraham wrote to Surat from Angediva island:

"I know that you feared that we might become a trouble to you, and so cared not whither you sent us, so that you were rid of us. If these people miscarry, I must lay their lives at your door; for I told you that without his assistance [the Governor of Karwar] we could not stay there [Angediva], which, you assured me, we should have."¹

When he wrote these incriminating words, Sir Abraham Shipman was no doubt in an embittered mood; yet his accusation cannot simply be discarded on that account. Whatever may have been the attitude of the Surat Factors in this rather unsavoury episode, there is no denying that they could scarcely have bundled off Dutch or French soldiers more unceremoniously than they did their own countrymen.

After the idea of capturing Danda Rajpuri had been given up as impracticable, and after the proposal to convey the troops to Mauritius and Reunion had been taken exception to, the Angediva island scheme was discussed. Sir Abraham Shipman strongly opposed the proposal, but finally gave in to the Earl of Marlborough's pleadings. The Surat letter to the Company, dated the 8th December, 1662, gives the following brief account:

"At last they have resolved and pitched upon Angediva, that lies in the mouth of Karwar; which they were hardly brought to, but rather to continue their quarters here; against which we strongly objected the jealousies of these people [the Mogul Governor] and their unwillingness that they should harbour here any longer. Unwilling they were to remove; but at last they were persuaded by the positive commands of the Lord Marlborough, to whom we, in your behalves, are much obliged in his willingness to comply in all things that [tended] to the accommodation of affairs."²

The Earl of Marlborough, who had made up his mind to return home, was evidently as anxious to get rid of the soldiers as were the Surat authorities.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1564, p. 217. ² Ibid., p. 139.

Angediva Island was uninhabited, and after the Portuguese evacuation in 1506, had not been claimed by any one. Nevertheless, in order to avoid all future difficulties, it was resolved upon to approach the King of Bijapur to acquaint him with the plan. On the 6th December, 1662, the President and Council of Surat wrote to the factors of Karwar:

“Sir Abraham Shipman, the Commander-in-Chief and Governor of the soldiers, is designed to wait the king’s orders for their future proceedings upon Angediva. We cannot imagine how any Governor or King under whom you live can possibly be offended at it. However, if any such thing shall arise, assure them there is no evil intended them, but a principal good; and that by letters of your Superiors you are required to assure them that the President and Council intend to make it the most flourishing port in India and bring all the trade thither. But this you must hint warily to one or two of the most eminent persons of them and no more, encouraging them to expect great things.”¹

Sir Abraham Shipman, relying on the assurances given him by the President and Council of Surat, left Suvali on the 12th December, 1665, with the Expeditionary Force on board the *Leopard* and the *Chestnut*, and sailed for Karwar, with the intention of making Angediva his temporary quarters. But a further disappointment was in store for him. The Governor of Karwar did not swallow the bait of the free gift of the most flourishing sea-port in India to be built for him on Angediva island by the kind-hearted gentlemen of Surat. Captain Minors in a letter dated Karwar Road, the 22nd December, wrote to Sir George Oxenden.

“We arrived here two days since, and meeting with Mr. Masters on board the *Mary Rose* (who was ready to sail for Surat) he gave Sir Abraham, not only hopes, but an assurance that Angediva would on demand be freely surrendered. But his confidence raised us only to a fictitious paradise; for Mr. Ball and Captain Middleton having since waited on the Governor of Karwar (who is some miles up in the country) to receive his consent for Sir Abraham’s landing with his people in the island, they are this noon returned with a most unpleasant answer that the Governor will on no terms admit it; and if Sir Abraham but attempts it, he will with all his forces

¹ Ibid., p. 140.

endeavour to destroy them, imprison your merchants ashore, and seize all their effects; affirming that the Dutch have often and earnestly solicited him by letters and messengers, courted him with presents to get it into possession; but he would never condescend thereto. So that now we are in a great perplexity, not knowing how to dispose of the soldiers, some of whom are already dead, many others sick, and do much pester and annoy the ship. God preserve us of an infection in this hot day. This disappointment is a great remora [hindrance] to our future proceedings, we being not at present in a capacity to fit our ship for the sail from hence, till My Lord [the Earl of Marlborough] arrives and eases us of the soldiers; which we must presently attend, it being not possible at present to prosecute your instructions in going to Porca; which is no fault of mine.”¹

When the news of this untoward event reached Surat, the Earl of Marlborough proceeded to Karwar on the *Dunkirk* with a sufficient force to protect the landing of Sir Abraham’s soldiers in defiance of the Governor’s prohibition. The following account of the occupation of Angediva is taken from a report, forwarded by Captain John Stevens, and dated the 14th January, 1663.

“I found the infantry on shore. I likewise landed mine; but nothing else was landed out of either ship, but what was necessary, for the present, until the arrival of the Earl of Marlborough, which was on the 11th instant [11th January 1663]. The 12th we landed most part of our ammunition and provision; the 13th, the remainder; and spread the His Majesty’s colours upon the island [and] mounted six guns ashore. The ships discharged several guns as likewise those on shore. The circumference of the island is not past two miles or thereabouts, but fortified both by nature and the industry of the Portugals. It affords very good water from the rocks in springs abundantly, and likewise a pond or tank made by hand in the island, which will suffice thousands of people. For firewood and other wood and long grass to thatch withal it abounds, and doubtless will produce fruits, herbs and salleting [salad] if planted; for there is good mould upon the island.”²

As soon as he had landed the Expeditionary Force at Angediva, the Earl of Marlborough started on his homeward voyage.

In a Surat letter to the Company, dated the 6th April, 1663, it is recorded:

¹ Ibid., p. 141. ² Ibid., pp. 214-215.

"The Lord Marlborough endeavoured to settle them [the soldiers] the best he could, and sailed thence on the 14th January."¹

Stay at Angediva

The stay at Angediva is one of the most tragical events in the history of the Expeditionary Force.

To begin with, there was the Governor of Karwar's opposition to the occupation of the island by Sir Abraham Shipman and his men. On the 26th January, 1663, Sir Abraham wrote to Surat:

"I have endeavoured by all means to gain a peace with the Governor of Karwar, but cannot obtain it on any terms, unless I will admit 6 or 7 of his men to reside upon the island to receive a custom upon all provisions that shall be brought into the island, and that I shall give him security to leave the island in two years' time and not to fortify it at all; none of which his proposals can I consent to. I have presented him and his servants with about 50£, all which he keeps, and will agree to nothing but upon these conditions, which I can never consent to. Sir, you see into what a labyrinth you and your Council have thrown me into, being so confident that we should have his assistance and friendship for our sustentation and fortication; and now we find neither; the rains [are] approaching, and we have got as yet neither timber nor workman, nor know when we shall. Now if any new reverse happens either to the Factors or Factory [at Karwar], you are to thank yourself."²

Though Sir Abraham was but a few weeks on the island, he was already greatly discouraged and strangely obsessed with dark forebodings about the doom impending over the Expeditionary Force, because his own countrymen had left him in the lurch.³

The Surat Authorities were glad to be rid of the Expeditionary Force, and the Karwar Factors did not welcome their arrival at Angediva. In fact they resented Sir Abraham Shipman's attitude, and on the 27th February, 1663, they wrote to Surat:

"The 15th of this instant arrived here Robert Masters from you, who ever since his arrival has endeavoured to compose the difference between this Governor and Sir Abraham, but as yet can do nothing in the business, the cause proceeding rather from Sir Abraham's standing upon some punctilios than anything material . . . Sir Abraham has promised us not to disturb the Governor's dominions, who is resolved not to provoke him."⁴

¹ Ibid., pp. 222. ² Ibid., p. 217. ³ Ibid., 217. ⁴ Ibid., p. 221.

It can easily be understood that the Governor of Karwar should not have consented to an unconditional occupation of the island; and his demands were not unreasonable. At the same time a word may be said in Sir Abraham's favour. It is but natural that he resented to pay customs on all provisions landed in the island; for his expenses would thereby be considerably increased, and he was not too well supplied with funds. This was probably why he took exception to the Governor's demands, a line of conduct with which the Karwar Factors might have at least silently sympathised, instead of accusing him of 'standing upon some punctilios'.

Sir Abraham Shipman was not anxious to come to an open rupture with the Governor of Karwar; he did his best to placate that ruler by means of presents. In a letter to Surat he wrote:

"I have sent you a bill for 40£, for these things you sent me. I presented most of them to the Governor of Karwar, which was thought by Mr. Ball and the Banya more proper for him. I added many things of my own, as a rich crimson velvet saddle and furniture, a case of pistols, a great looking glass, six sword blades, and several things that I gave to his servants, hoping to have had a peace with him."¹

But these hopes did not materialise.

"But instead of peace he has commenced acts of hostilities against me, stopping of boats that were coming to me, beating of the people, and threatening that, if they came to this island again, to cut their throats; and this to people that were not of his country. Now to take my presents, and not to do my business, was strange; but to use hostilities, much more strange. Sir, I could very easily right myself for this injury, were it not for doing injury to the Factors ashore, who say that, if anything happens, they shall be sure to die for it, and likewise the Factory and the goods of the Company would be lost. Sir, I do not weigh his friendship, having got such things as I stood in need of from other places with very great trouble. If he had made peace with me at first, he would have done me a kindness; now none; for I do not much care for it."²

In this letter Sir Abraham does not appear in the light of a selfish man 'standing upon punctilios'; he seems to have been a true English gentleman. The Governor of Karwar continued

¹ Ibid., p. 221. ² Ibid.

hostile. On the 18th November, 1663, Sir Abraham Shipman wrote to Sir George Carteret, Vice-Chamberlain of the Household.

"The King of [the] Deccan being our mortal enemy and near neighbour, not much above half a mile from us, and is daily threatening to beat us out. Therefore I desire you with all expedition to procure us a supply of men to be sent us; for whether we stay here, or go to Bombay, we need men."¹

At last, however, the Governor seems to have given up his demands. A private letter from Master at Karwar on the 18th April, 1664, informed Sir George Oxenden:

"Our Governor and Sir Abraham Shipman have at last come to an agreement; so that now they have free leave to trade from the island to the main [land], and have all sorts of fresh provisions carried to them."²

But the hostility shown by the Governor of Karwar dwindles into insignificance when compared to the relentlessness with which death played havoc in the ranks of the Expeditionary Force, indiscriminately carrying off privates and officers.

On the 18th November, 1663, Sir Abraham Shipman wrote to Sir George Carteret:

"Our wintering here has been very pestilential, both to officers and soldiers; for of the 450 brought out of Downes [we] are now reduced to under 150; and if we be forced to stay another winter, and sustain but a tolerable loss by mortality, we shall be disenabled to keep this place; the island being large and we having but few men."³

In trying to account for the appalling rate of mortality Da Cunha remarks: "Here [*Angediva*] they remained about two years under the shelter of a few huts and without sufficient protection from the deadly effects of the climate. The consequence was that Sir Abraham Shipman perished in the island during that short interval—the marshy condition of island, the absence of every accommodation to which a European is accustomed and the scarcity of provisions having thinned their numbers rapidly."⁴

This estimate is fairly correct; for in the documents climatic conditions are often alluded to as one of the causes of the many cases of death.

When in 1663 the rains set in, the sufferings of the garrison, badly housed and ill supplied, became intense. In the same June

¹ Ibid., p. 225. ² Ibid., p. 334. ³ Ibid., p. 225. ⁴ Da Cunha, H. A. I. A., p

1663, Giffard and Ferrand wrote from Goa that two men had arrived from Angediva and had reported that over two hundred had died there.¹

About a month later, on the 25th August, the Karwar Factors informed Surat that:

"Sir Abraham Shipman is very ill himself, but has buried most of his men. He had a month ago but 130 men left, of which there were but three of the officers that came out of England; and almost half of them that were left was sick."²

In the same month of August Sir Abraham himself wrote:

"This business has more broken me than twenty years past At one time we had not twenty sound men to stand to their arms and their duty If it be our misfortune to stay another winter, I do not know what shall become of us, unless it please God to give health to our people; for if any more die, we shall be in a very sad condition."³

What must have made their sufferings more painful, was that they were left to shift for themselves. There is no evidence extant that either the Surat authorities or the Karwar Factors did anything to come to Shipman's relief. Well are we told that Sir Abraham had to buy medicines in Goa at a dear rate, and urges therefore a supply from home.⁴

But there was, besides the climatic conditions, another agency at work, decimating the ranks of the Expeditionary Force. On the 14th November, 1663, the Surat President and Council wrote to the Company that Sir Abraham Shipman had lost the greatest part of his force.

"It is conceived more by their intemperances, ill diet and want of being well stored with necessaries than the malignity of the air."⁵

This was not the first time that the Surat Authorities thus spoke of the Expeditionary Force. On the 6th April, 1663, they had written:

¹ Foster., E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 223. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., pp. 225-226.

⁴ Ibid., p. 225. ⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

"But they addict themselves to nothing but drunkenness, and will not do so much as build themselves sheds or houses to keep the weather from them."¹

Again Henry Gary wrote to Sir George Carteret on the 25th January, 1664:

"God deliver them from that insalubrious clime, or rather make them more temperate; for I am persuaded that the major part dies of surfeits."²

It would seem that this accusation was well founded. When the Earl of Marlborough helped to land the Expeditionary Force in the island, he informed Sir George Oxenden, in a letter of the 14th January, 1663, that he found as good as war between Captain Minors and Sir Abraham.

"I had an evil welcome aboard, and bad thanks for my sending six guns ashore, with my own men to mount them, as also the boats mast for a flag-staff. The ship's carpenter had his pate broken, others of my own men were beaten and clapt upon the guard. Sir Abraham Shipman was in no fault, but rather I or Captain Brown for sending a pipe of wine ashore, which for the present has made them all mad."³

Sir Abraham Shipman himself laments that no commander ever had such 'debouste' officers. If he had died in the beginning of the occupation, his second-in-command, Colonel John Hungerford, would soon have spent all the money available, "he being very much given to drink."

In course of time the number of deaths greatly diminished; perhaps those who were spared had made a virtue of necessity and learned to practise sobriety. On the 12th March, 1665, Sir George Oxenden wrote to the King:

"The first year proved very fatal to the soldiery, which no reason can be given for, since this last [year] has so well agreed with them that they have not lost five men in the whole twelve months upon the island, which in itself stands in a good and wholesome air; and therefore it is generally imputed to the men's disagreeing with these parts and intemperate life."⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 222. ² Ibid., p. 226. ³ Ibid., p. 215.

⁴ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, p. 42.

Whatever may have been their failings and weaknesses, one cannot but feel for the 300 men and more that left their home in the strength of their manhood and, becoming the victims of adverse circumstances, breathed their last on the lonely little island, where their passage has left no traces behind them: no tomb-stone, no epitaph, not even a grass covered mound or rough-built cairn to mark their graves.

Among these victims there is none more to be pitied than their commander, Sir Abraham Shipman. His death was in no way due to intemperance. In the course of the year 1663 it was already reported to Surat that Shipman had had 'two great fits of sickness'; and he himself wrote: "This business has more broken me than 20 years past", and he excused the brevity of the letter on the score of his own ill health.

What made his demise so sad was that on Angediva island they were daily expecting orders from His Majesty 'for our removing to Bombay'. But when the time to leave Angediva came, Sir Abraham was sleeping under the sod. It appears that he contracted his last illness on a visit to Salsette near Goa; and when he came back to Angediva, he knew that his hour was come.

Meanwhile in the month of November, 1663, King Charles II, in order to remove all doubts as to the person to whom Bombay should be handed over, issued a new commission.

"Charles by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith . . . Be it known to all that confiding in the prudence and integrity of the faithful Abraham Shipman, our beloved subject, Knight of the Golden Ensign and Gentleman of our Privy Council [we] have made, ordained and deputed, and do by these presents make, ordain, constitute and appoint our true and indubitable Commissary Deputy and Attorney to take possession of the said port and Island of Bombay, giving him and granting unto the said Abraham Shipman our true and lawful powers and authority to receive in our name and for our use the said port and island of Bombay, together with the fortresses and other things belonging to us by the contract. And for the better execution of the said concession, we have in witness thereof and by these presents set our hand and caused our seals to be affixed. Given in our palace at

Whitehall, the 23rd November, 1663, the fifteenth year of our reign. (Signed) Charles R."¹

It has been assumed by Da Cunha² and Campbell³ that this Commission reached Angediva before the 15th April, 1664. On that day Sir Abraham Shipman issued the following orders:

"I, Sir Abraham Shipman, of His Majesty's Privy Council, Governor of all the Forces of His Britannic Majesty in the land of Bombay in the East Indies, do by virtue of the commission given me by His Majesty of Great Britain under the seal of England constitute and ordain Humphrey Cooke as Vice-Governor and in his absence Ensign John Torne commanding a regiment of soldiers at present quartered on the island of Angediva, till such time as other orders come from England. I therefore direct all the captains, sergeants, and all the rest of the officers of the said regiment shall obey the orders of the said Humphrey Cooke and in his absence of Ensign John Thorne. Written at Angediva, the 5th April, 1664" (Signed) Abraham Shipman. Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of us- (Signed) John Foldevry, (Signed) Thomas Price, (Signed) Roger Morgan (Signed) Henry Anderson.⁴

The allusion in these orders to 'the Commission given me by His Majesty of Great Britain' does not warrant the conclusion that the Commission of the 23rd November, 1663, had already reached Sir Abraham Shipman on the 5th April, 1664. These words may as well refer to Shipman's first appointment in 1662. And this seems really to be the case.

On the 4th April, 1664, the President and Council of Surat wrote to the Company:

"On the 15th of the past February, by a Dutch ship that came from Persia, we were happy to receive yours of the 10th of August 1663."⁵

"Yesterday [on the 3rd April] by a Dutch ship from Persia we received transcript of Your Worships' letter of the 20th August, 1663, via Leghorn and Aleppo."⁶

From this it follows that Sir Abraham Shipman never received the Commission of the 23rd November, 1663; for on the 6th April, 1664, he died about eight o'clock at night.

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I, p. 13. ² Da Cunha, O. B., p. 251.

³ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I, p. 13. ⁴ Ibid. ⁵ Forrest, S. H. S., Vol. p. 36.

⁶ Ibid., p. 43.

"He was buried by the King's flag, the 7th April in the morning, with all the solemnity we could. All the ordinance were shot three times with volleys of small shot between the ordinance; which all here about much admired at."¹

To the very end his main concern was the welfare of his soldiers, and one of his last official acts was on their behalf. On the 18th April Mr. Master at Karwar was apparently not yet aware of Sir Abraham's death; for he wrote:

"Our Governor and Sir Abraham are at last come to an agreement; so that they have free leave to trade from the island to the main [land] and have all sorts of fresh provisions carried over to them".²

The following is quoted from Surat, dated the 26th November, 1664:

"The 16th June we had news of the death of Sir Abraham Shipman. He deceased the 8th [sic] April. All his officers being before dead, he constituted Mr. Humphrey Cooke, that came out in quality of his secretary, Lieutenant Governor of His Majesty's forces. There is remaining in the island of Angediva about 130 soldiers, two only died this year. They are now preparing to take possession of the island of Bombay, having permission from the Viceroy of Goa."³

The news of Shipman's death reached London in July, 1665. Prior to this date the Company had been informed of the sad predicament of the forces at Angediva; and about April, 1664, they sent orders that a muster should be taken of the soldiers in Angediva. These orders were transmitted to Sir George Oxenden, who in a letter of the 8th October, 1664, entrusted Robert Master at Karwar with the duty. When Henry Gary was sent as assistant to Humphrey Cooke, the task was transferred to him.

The muster was taken not in Angediva Island, but at Bombay, in February, 1665.

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 333-334. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid., p. 335.

VIII The Viceroy Capitulates

Peremptory Orders

Whatever may have been the sufferings of the Expeditionary Force, its leaders never despaired of ultimately obtaining what they had been sent to take possession of. On the 26th August, 1664, Humphrey Cooke, who had succeeded Sir Abraham Shipman as commander of the remaining troops and as Vice-Governor of Bombay, wrote to the authorities in London:

"We are daily expecting orders from His Majesty for our removing to Bombay, to be cleared of this unwholesome island [Angediva], where we have lost upwards of 250 men, and [where there is] at present but one commissioned officer, an ensign, alive, of all that came out of England."¹

This admirable patience was about to be rewarded; and Antonio de Mello de Castro was at last made to realise that his obstructionist policy was doomed to end in failure; for the Authorities at Lisbon gave him clearly to understand that they expected him to hand over Bombay without any further delay.

On the 16th August, 1663, the King of Portugal wrote the following letter, which is partly a formal disapproval of the Viceroy's conduct, and partly an order to carry out the mission with which he had been entrusted:

"I, King, send greeting. By way of England intelligence reached me that in the States of India doubts arose with respect to the delivery of the town of Bombay to the order of the King of Great Britain, my good brother and cousin, in uniformity with mine [order], which you carried with you. At this I was greatly surprised and am very sorry; because, besides the reasons of convenience of this Crown and more specially of the States of India, which made it necessary for me to take that resolution, I wish much to give the King of England, my brother, every satisfaction. For these and other considerations of the same identity, as well as because the King, my brother, must have sent fresh orders, removing every doubt that might have originated from those [orders] he sent first, I therefore direct and order that you do in compliance with those orders of mine, which you carried with you, cause

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 333.

to execute the said delivery with every punctuality and without the least contradiction, as the matter does not admit of any, and the delay is prejudicial. By complying therewith, as I expect from you, I will consider myself well-served by you. If you meet with any impediments from any person, you will order to proceed against him publicly, as the case may require.”¹

It would seem that this letter was dispatched from Lisbon before Antonio de Mello de Castro’s letter of the 28th December, 1662, had reached Portugal. It was probably written after the Court of Lisbon had been informed of the resentment caused in England at the news of the non-cession of Bombay.

About six months later, on the 8th February, 1664, the King of Portugal officially acknowledged Antonio de Mello de Castro’s letter of the 28th December, 1662.

“By your letter, which has been brought to us overland by Manuel Godinho, a religious of the Company of Jesus, I saw with great pain the difficulties which have arisen with regard to the delivery of Bombay to the King of Britain, my brother and cousin, according to the capitulations and the orders I gave you when you left. Whatever is stipulated in the capitulations and reasons for giving contentment to the King, my brother, admits of no doubt; and I trust that with your prudence you have now arranged matters so far that you will carry out my instructions without further delay. Should any fresh difficulties present themselves, I order you to overcome them in a manner that I may feel grateful to you. To the inhabitants of the island you must say that they have misunderstood the article of capitulation shown them, as their estates (*fazendas*) will not be confiscated, but they will be allowed to remain in possession of them as heretofore. The only difference will be that they will be under the dominion of the King of Britain, my brother, who will rule them with justice and in the freedom of the Roman Catholic religion, as it is the practice in Europe among peoples and cities with similar treaties; and with his power he will defend them and secure them in their trade, that they may attain to the opulence they desire. The King of England also undertakes to protect the places I have in that State, and this was one of the reasons for my giving him that island. The inhabitants of the island are so clearly allied by nationality, parentage and convenience to the best of the Portuguese all over India that I consider the arrangement will be for their common good. You must use all the means in your power to hand over that place soon, as this affair will admit of no delay. Immediately the delivery has taken place, you will advise me, as it is of the utmost importance that it should be known here.”²

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., p. 249. ² Ibid., pp. 254-255.

This letter is in many respects disappointing, in as much as it fails to shed any fresh light either on the religious freedom that had been promised to the Catholic inhabitants of Bombay island, or on their proprietary rights. Its phraseology is as vague as that of the treaty of 1661, of which it is a paraphrased reiteration. From its general tone and trend it may be gathered that the Court at Lisbon meant to forestall the demands of the English Monarch, who had asked that the Viceroy should be punished, that a sum of £100,000 should be paid to make good the expenses of the Expeditionary Force, and that Salsette should be ceded together with Bombay. Moreover this letter did not prove a determinating factor in the game of politics; for before it reached the Viceroy, the latter had already made up his mind to surrender Bombay. The Viceroy's change of mind was brought about by the letter of the 16th August, 1663, of which a copy had been sent to England, whence it was forwarded to India together with the following instructions, dated Whitehall, 31st October, 1663, and addressed to Sir Abraham Shipman:

"At my Lord Marlborough's return His Majesty heard from His Lordship how unworthily the Vice-King of Bombay, Dom Antonio de Mello de Castro, had proceeded, denying the surrender of that place and island to His Majesty, according to the article inserted in the treaty with the King of Portugal and his supposed instructions to that effect. And besides the affront done to himself therein, His Majesty did with much trouble of mind reflect upon the sufferings you and the troops under your command would undergo by this disappointment; of which he has caused those complaints to be made in the Court of Portugal, which such a proceeding deserves. In which he is promised all due satisfaction, the first earnest of which is the sending new letters to the Vice-King, commanding him immediately to surrender the place into the hands of those the King, our Master, shall appoint to receive it. Which letters together with a copy of them go here inclosed in Portuguese and English, if you should chance not to understand that language. Which said original letters it is His Majesty's pleasure that you cause to be delivered to the Vice-King, demanding the execution of the contents of it, according to which you are to take possession of what they will deliver into your hands, directing yourself therein by those instructions which My Lord of Marlborough has already, or may with this send to you, in case his indisposition in the country will permit him to write by this occasion. And if in the surrender anything be detained from you that you think the article in the

treaty (of which you will also herewith receive an authentic copy) entitles His Majesty to, you are to take what is given, and protect against the detention of the rest.

"This is sent you by the way of Allepo at random, suspecting much the certainty of its arrival; the other (for there are two letters of the same kind sent from the Court of Portugal) shall be sent you by sea. With more particular directions and succours for yourself and your men, as soon as His Majesty can dispatch a ship into those parts. In the meantime Sir George Oxenden has it very particularly recommended to him by the East India Company to supply you to the utmost of his power with things you and your men stand in need of; which is promised with the conveyance of those letters to you."¹

These instructions reached Angediva in October, 1664.

On the 3rd March, 1665, Humphrey Cooke wrote to London:

The *Chestnut* pink arrived at Angediva from Persia the 25th October, 1664, who brought a packet of letters from His Majesty via Aleppo, dated 26th November, 1663; with a letter enclosed to the Viceroy of Goa, Don Antonio de Mello de Castro, from the King of Portugal and, secondly, orders from our King's Majesty for our receiving the island of Bombay."²

On the 24th October, 1664, Randolph Taylor wrote from Goa:

"The 22nd (October) came in the *Chestnut* pink from Angediva and the *America* from Surat, the former with His Majesty's and the King of Portugal's advice about Bombay, which yesterday (being Sunday) [23rd October] Captain Stephens and Ensign Thorne, sent for from above by the Viceroy, went up to deliver to His Excellency."³

There is a slight chronological discrepancy in the letters of Cooke and Taylor. The *Chestnut* is said to have reached Goa from Angediva on the 22nd October, according to Taylor; whilst she only reached Angediva on the 25th of that month, according to Cooke.

As soon as the *Chestnut* reached Angediva, Humphrey Cooke despatched her to Goa with the letters from England:

"At which, on their [the letters'] receipt, I ordered the *Chestnut* pink to sail for Goa, and sent one [letter] with the aforesaid letters and other

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 447. ² Ibid., p. 464.

³ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 335.

papers necessary from myself to the Viceroy, demanding in the King's Majesty my Master's name the possession of the said island of Bombay and all else, as agreed by the articles of peace between the two Crowns."¹

It has been impossible to ascertain whether, previous to receiving Humphrey Cooke's dispatches, Antonio de Mello de Castro had already been made aware of his master's orders by letters that had reached Goa from Lisbon. What lends colour to such a surmise is that the Viceroy acted so promptly that it would seem that he was prepared for what was coming.

Randolph Taylor wrote:

"They [Captain Stephens and Ensign Thorne] seem to have a great deal of hopes of his [the Viceroy's] compliance with the King of Portugal's order for the delivery of the place, which, they say, is positively commanded with some kind of menaces inserted in case of not compliance."²

But Randolph Taylor, who seems to have formed a fairly correct estimate of the Viceroy's character was not so sanguine about it. He pointedly remarks:

"But I am persuaded that Sir Abraham's death or some such story will be thought on for a pretence to detain the place in their possession; and this I imagine from some expressions that I heard fall from some of the nobles of his Council (as His Excellency calls them). I wish I may prove a false prophet in this particular."³

Orders Obeyed

Wishes are proverbially vain, but not so Taylor's wish, which came true. Antonio de Mello de Castro had by this time realised that he was playing a lone hand, and that it was high time for him to relegate his personal spite and resentment to the background, and to forget the insults he had received at the hands of the English. This change of front, though imperative, must have been all the more painful to him, because he could so easily have continued quibbling and procrastinating. Thus, for example, in the royal commission of the 23rd November, 1663, by which Sir Abraham Shipman had been appointed the King's deputy to receive the

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 464. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, pp. 335-336.

³ Ibid.

island of Bombay, the possibility of Sir Abraham's demise had not been contemplated, nor had any provision been made in the document for a successor, to whom Sir Abraham's authority should be transmitted. But the unexpected and unforeseen was fated to occur. Sir Abraham died in the 6th April, 1664; and on the eve of his death he had appointed Humphrey Cooke as his successor, as has already been recorded.

It would have been the height of folly on the part of Antonio de Mello de Castro to question the authenticity of this document; but nothing could have been easier than to point out that Humphrey Cooke was nowhere mentioned in the royal commission of the 23rd November, 1663, as the King's deputy to whom Bombay should be delivered. But the Viceroy did not venture to make capital out of this technical impediment. He had made up his mind to capitulate and his only anxiety was now to save appearances.

On the 3rd November he wrote the following letter to Goa:

"I have received a letter from His Majesty, whom God preserve, ordering me to deliver Bombay; but I do not know to whom to deliver it, as Abraham Shipman, in whose behalf the King of England had issued the commission, is dead, and it is not transferable to any other person. And as this order is identical with the one I brought with me, directing that I should demand the credentials from the King to the person to whom the possession of the island shall be given, and the delivery made, committing the whole to writing in order to avoid any uncertainty for all time, in virtue of the capitulations, I thought the matter to belong rather to law, and sent the letters and the warrant to the Court [of Goa], requesting them to decide in the mode judicial for the delivery of the island, thus satisfying both the King of England with what has been promised him, and the King our Lord by obeying strictly his orders, writing a statement of all the circumstances, as the letter requires, and the right demands. I request the magistrates (*desembargadores*) that, after reading the papers and weighing the words, they send me their opinion in writing, to be discussed in the Council of State, and to settle all other parts relating to this affair; and all to be done as quickly as possible."¹

This was not the first time that Antonio de Mello de Castro appealed to Goa for advice. On another occasion, already record-

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., p. 256.

ed, he had suggested to Sir Abraham Shipman to submit the disputed validity of his credentials to the Governors of Goa. This took place in 1662, when the said Governors decided in favour of Sir Abraham, without the latter profiting thereby; for then Antonio de Mello de Castro quietly ignored the verdict of his countrymen. But this time he was in earnest, and even hoped that the *desembar-gadores* should settle the case in Humphrey Cooke's favour; for this was the only way in which he could wriggle out of the meshes in which he was now entangled.

Nor did he make a secret of it that he meant to comply with the King of Portugal's orders, as may be gathered from Humphrey Cooke's letter.

"He (Antonio de Mello de Castro) received the King of Portugal's letter with great ceremony, and answered he would comply in the surrender according to the King his Master's order; withal, said he, [he] must have two or three days to advise with his Council. After which the said Viceroy demands the orders Sir Abraham Shipman had from our King's Majesty to constitute a Lieutenant-Governor, and my commission from him. I send him copies of both the said Sir Abraham's commission under the great seal of the King of England and my own, having them authentically confirmed by witnesses, and ordered them to be translated into Portuguese, and then to present them (with another letter I wrote him) to the same effect as my first."¹

It may here be pointed out that Antonio de Mello de Castro played to the very end the part of the conscientious servant. He asked for King of England's orders authorising Sir Abraham Shipman to appoint a successor. Such authority had never been granted to Sir Abraham Shipman. But Humphrey Cooke wisely did not dispute the point and forwarded the royal commission appointing Sir Abraham Shipman as the King's deputy, and the commission by which Sir Shipman had appointed his successor.

The latter document was forwarded to Goa with the following endorsement:

"We, whose names are hereunder written, do certify that the above writing with the signatures is a true copy of the original, which remains

¹ Khan, A.—P. N. B. pp. 464-465.

in charge of the said Vice-Governor Humphrey Cooke. Written at Angediva, the 17th November, 1664, (Signed) John Stephens, Valenter Farred, Walter Golopher, John Bird, William Lincoln, Thomas Farly.”¹

To this was added:

“I, Joao Gregorio of the Company of Jesus, do certify in verbo sacerdotis [on my word as a Priest] that this is a true translation conformable to the original. This 5th day of November, 1664. (Signed) Joao Gregorio. I, Antonio Gabriel Preto, Senior Clerk of the Civil Court and of Justifications of the State of Goa, do hereby attest that the certificate of the above translation and signature attesting the same is the handwriting and signature of Padre Joao Gregorio of the Company of Jesus. Goa, 6th November, 1664. (Signed) Antonio Gabriel Preto.”²

From this it may be inferred that Padre Joao Gregorio was residing at Goa, and was called upon to translate from English into Portuguese Mr. Cooke’s commission that had been sent from Angediva. It has of course escaped the notice of the official Historians that a Jesuit Padre was thus called upon to play an important part in the judicial inquiry which ultimately resulted in the cession of Bombay. For the investigating judges had to rely on the word of a Jesuit Priest for the exact meaning of the document by which Sir Abraham Shipman had bequeathed his authority to Humphrey Cooke.

Such delay as took place was in no way due to Father Joao Gregorio, but originated from a doubt, which had arisen in the minds of the judges, as to the identity of the person who had been appointed Vice-Governor by Sir Abraham Shipman.

Anyhow the doubt was set at rest by Humphrey Cooke himself. On the 3rd March, 1665, Cooke wrote:

“After a month’s debate, both he (Antonio de Mello de Castro) and the Council at Goa concluded a surrender must be made, and ordered papers to be drawn up to that effect, all of them signing for the said surrender. The Viceroy immediately wrote me to Angediva that it was concluded to make a rendition to us; so (he) desires that I provide myself and soldiery to receive the island of Bombay in our King’s name, and that I should go to Goa for orders, and that at my arrival he would nominate two persons to go with me to deliver us possession.”³

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I., p. 13. ² Ibid.

³ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 465.

In the light of what has been said before, it follows that the surrender here spoken of, was conditional on Humphrey Cooke's proving that he was the person mentioned by Sir Abraham Shipman to act as his successor. Humphrey was at that time in Goa as is made plain by the following extracts:

"To give possession and to make delivery of the said island and Bombay and its port to the Most Serene King of Great Britain or to the person who should be vested with power and authority from the most Serene King of Great Britain to receive charge of the said port and island of Bombay, for and in behalf and in his name, Governor Humphrey Cooke being present stated that he was the person who had powers and authority from the Most Serene King of Britain, his Master, to accept in his name possession and charge of the said island of Bombay and its port, having succeeded in the room of Sir Abraham Shipman, to whom the said possession and charge was to have been given, and who appointed and nominated him, Humphrey Cooke, to succeed him in case of his death."¹

As regards the doubt concerning Humphrey Cooke's identity the following is Antonio de Mello de Castro's own account.

"The directions of the Viceroy [Antonio de Mello de Castro] did not mention the proper name of Governor Humphrey Cooke in order to give him the possession and cause the delivery of the said island and its port. This occasioned some doubts; but the said Governor, Inofre Cooke, replied that he was the same Humphrey nominated in the English language by Sir Abraham Shipman, and that Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos, Overseer of General States, being of the Goa Council, knows it to be so. Upon this it was determined to give him the said possession and make the said delivery of the said island. The same was also known to the Chancellor, who was consulted on the occasion, and his opinion was taken by the Viceroy, of which the said Inofre Cooke was acquainted, having been told so at Goa.

"Furthermore Governor Cooke presented several letters, which the said Viceroy had written to him upon the subject, addressing him by his proper name Inofre Cooke, Governor of the island of Bombay and of the warlike people of His Most Serene Majesty King of Great Britain, stating that he had orders to put him in possession of the said island and its port, and that on that account he had come from Goa by the fleet, which the Viceroy sent as far as the city of Ghaul, the Captain Commandant of which was his son, Dionisio de Mello de Castro; also that the Most Serene King of Portugal

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I., p. 14.

admitted of no further delay and ordered the island to be delivered without the least doubt or delay. This the said Governor Cooke did accordingly ask and demand in behalf and in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain with three letters from the said Viceroy, which remove every doubt there might exist.”¹

Thus was the question of Bombay’s surrender finally settled. Antonio de Mello Castro readily accepted the decision of the Goan magistrates. What is more, the above quoted summary of the proceedings of the judicial inquiry was actually drawn up by the Viceroy himself; so that it looked as though he had seen the errors of his ways, and now gave public proof of a complete change of heart. This is how things looked, but appearances are often deceptive.

¹ Ibid.

IX Humphrey Cooke at Goa

Leaving Angediva

In the official account of the judicial inquiry by the *desembargadores* into the question of the surrender of Bombay mention is made of Humphrey Cooke's presence at Goa. When and how did Cooke leave Angediva, and why did he go to Goa?

On the receipt of the London letters in October 1664, Humphrey Cooke became impatient to leave Angediva island. But the great problem was to provide the necessary shipping to transport himself and the remnants of the Expeditionary Force. His impatience ran fever-high when in November 1664 he learned that Antonio de Mello de Castro had at last made up his mind to hand over Bombay. Thereupon Cooke wrote at once to Surat, and asked the President and Council to help him to get out of Angediva.

"We having no ships to transport our men and lumber, I dispatched the *Chestnut* pink to Surat [on the 30th October, 1664]¹ to Sir George Oxenden, and sent him a copy of the agreement of the Viceroy and Council to surrender us Bombay; and that now we only wanted shipping to transport us up. Therefore I desired him [Sir George Oxenden] in the King's Majesty's name to order us shipping; and that, when that could not be done at Surat, he would please send his orders to the commanders of the Company's ships then at Karwar, lading pepper, that they might take the soldiery and lumber in, and land us at Bombay, which was in their way to Surat, and would not have been fifteen days' hindrance."²

Humphrey Cooke's appeal to the Surat authorities fell on unsympathetic ears. There were rumours afloat that the Dutch might at any time swoop down upon Bombay and capture it. On the 2nd January, 1665, they wrote to the Company:

"What you write us of Bombay, as to the securing of your ships there upon occasion, it is a mere net, or rather the cod (i.e., bag) in a net, where they are sure to be taken and destroyed, it being an open road or bay, which

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 336. ² Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 465.

can in no way, offend an enemy or defend itself. Whereupon we have given the Deputy-Lieutenant [Humphrey Cooke] our opinions to use the same caution with ourselves, to desist taking possession for some small time, in hopes of some peaceable agreement between the Hollander and His Majesty.”¹

But the President and Council at Surat knew that Humphrey Cooke was not likely to fall in with their views.

“We are advised they [those in Angediva] are impatient, and resolve to possess the island, come what will of it; which raises great fears in us, in regard we cannot learn there is left above 130 men of what came out of England, and of them but one field-officer and he an ensign [John Thorne]; that, in case a breach happen, that island will certainly be lost to His Majesty.”²

In order to restrain Cooke from doing anything rash they informed him that they were sending Henry Gary to Goa in the *Chestnut* in order to assist in procuring shipping from the Portuguese, in which to carry the soldiers to Bombay.

Meanwhile Humphrey Cooke addressed himself also to the commanders of the ships at Karwar. On the 26th November he wrote to Captains James Barker, Robert Bower, Charles Higgen-son, commanders and officers of the ships, *Royal Charles*, *London*, and *America*, at anchor in the road of Karwar.

“Whereas I have received several orders from the King’s Majesty of England and the King of Portugal to the Viceroy and Council of Goa concerning the surrender of the island of Bombay, it is agreed and concluded that they are ready to deliver up the said island according to the articles between the two Crowns; and [he] has given me notice thereof to embark myself and all the soldiers and officers to take possession of the aforesaid island of Bombay in our King’s Majesty’s behalf, and to take in our way a person to Goa to effect the said delivery. We have not shipping here at present sufficient to transport us; and not knowing what may happen hereafter, concerning the above said promises, by delay, I do by these require you, in the King’s name, as you will answer the contrary at your peril, [to lend] your assistance hercin with your ships and men to transport myself and said soldiery with our lumber to the said island of Bombay, which is in your way to Surat; and you shall have what satisfaction the President, Sir George Oxenden, shall think fit for the said transportation. In compliance

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 340. ² Ibid.

herein you will do good service to the King's Majesty, and on the contrary will be prejudicial both to the Crown and our nation."¹

The captains proved as little amenable as Sir George Oxenden, and Humphrey Cooke then gives the following account of his doings:

"I finding our nation so backward, and that nothing would prevail for our transporting, this business being of so great importance both to His Majesty and [our] nation, and not to let slip the proffer of the Viceroy and Council of Goa for fear of other resolutions hereafter, although it has been much to the discredit of our nation our own ships not transporting us, I hired four barks at Goa to effect it with our pink and sloop, which carried all our soldiery and lumber. The danger of ill accommodation has been much, but rather than remain at Angediva the men were willing to do anything."²

It must here be pointed out that Humphrey Cooke somewhat exaggerated the part he played in procuring ships for transporting his troops. What really happened was that, when Cooke learned that Henry Gary had been sent to Goa, he dispatched Ensign Thorne from Angediva to that place with orders to procure the necessary vessels. Henry Gary had arrived in Goa on the 2nd December, John Thorne arrived a day later.

On the 4th December Gary reported that he had prevailed upon the Viceroy, 'though not without some difficulty', to lend six frigates.³

Henry Gary's report is corroborated by Taylor and Petit, who wrote on the 14th December:

"I advised of the Viceroy's having promised six frigates to help transport the soldiers, etc. from Angediva to Bombay; which he has since performed, and the 9th instant they departed hence with three hired small vessels more, which together with the pink [i.e. the *Chestnut*] are thought sufficient to effect this business."⁴

Stay in Goa

Humphrey Cooke and the remnants of the Expeditionary Force arrived at Goa on the 15th December. On the 26th December

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., pp. 463-464. ² Ibid., p. 465.

³ Foster, E. F. I., 1661-1664, p. 337. ⁴ Ibid., pp. 337-338.

Antonio de Mello de Castro sent to Humphrey Cooke a letter of welcome, of which the following seems to be a draft rather than the text itself.

"I did not answer the Governor's [Humphrey Cooke] first letter, because I looked upon the execution of what he requested of me to be the best and the most short answer, which I now have the pleasure to send, rejoicing much at his arrival at this Bar; and that he may have come with health is what I wish. A person shall be appointed to-morrow to go and deliver Bombay."¹

But there is a saying: 'To-morrow never comes'; of which Humphrey Cooke must have been forcibly reminded as he was chafing at the delay, which was made all the more irksome because he and his followers were cooped up in the narrow uncomfortable vessels in which they had come to Goa.

On the 4th January, 1665, Antonio de Mello de Castro wrote to Cooke that the time for his departure was fast approaching, but had not yet come.

"Having given the necessary orders to deliver Bombay to Your Honour in the manner as the King my master's order is to do, the fleet sailed to convoy the Europe ship to a latitude, and will return to-day. Your Honour may take your departure whenever you like, acquainting me whether you require anything else, as I am ready to do everything convenient or necessary for the service of the King of Great Britain and for your accommodation. You will always find me with good will. May God preserve you."²

Nothing could be more friendly than the Viceroy's letters of the 26th December, 1664, and the 4th January, 1665. Nevertheless it would be a mistake to imagine that Antonio de Mello had become of a lamblike disposition. He was rather like a sugar-coated quinine pill; and Humphrey Cooke was well aware of this. He afterwards wrote:

"Before I would get the dispatches for the two persons to be nominated to go with us to make the delivery, passed a full month, the soldeiry and myself lying aboard in the hot sun, which was not a little troublesome, besides the many abuses received from the Viceroy. Some of our soldiers that had run away from Angediva were taken by our people in the Road

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I. p. 14. ² Ibid., p. 15.

of Goa, going aboard a Portugal vessel, and were brought to me aboard the pink. The Captain of the Castle by the Viceroy's order would have commanded them ashore; which I refused, being our King's Majesty's subjects; upon which there was a great broil, to advise the particulars [of which] would be tedious. I was forced to deliver them, that our business of Bombay should not cease; the which I did to the Viceroy himself, with caution that he should secure them and see them forthcoming at demand whenever our King's Majesty should require them; but he little regarded that, but sent them aboard his vessel that was bound for Europe and took several other Englishmen from the East India Company's ships, and did the like; which had been no small affront to our nation."¹

A somewhat clearer account of this incident is given in a letter from Taylor and Petit to Surat, dated the 7th January, 1665.

"The Lieutenant-Governor [i.e. Cooke], meeting with two soldiers that ran away from Angediva, seized upon them; which being discovered to the Viceroy by Dom Francisco de Lima, who had shipped them aboard his vessel for Portugal, and was very earnest to get them again, the Viceroy to gratify a person to whom he is so obliged immediately ordered the Captain of Aguada Castle to seize upon any Englishman he could meet with, belonging to His Majesty; and he quickly found an opportunity to secure one Captain Jowles and Mr. Ball, which were kept prisoners in said fort, until the other two rogues were delivered back, and then released."²

On this occasion the Viceroy insisted on his own personal rights; for Cooke in his complaint lost sight of the fact that his ships were in Portuguese territorial waters. On the other hand, if the Viceroy had been in reality as friendly as he professed to be, he could easily have stretched a point to improve the spirit of mutual goodwill that was supposed to prevail; and the seizure of the two Englishmen was, to say the least, a most unfriendly act.

Another instance of the Viceroy being a wolf in lambskin hid, was his parting letter to Humphrey Cooke, dated the 8th January, 1665.

"All the dispatches are ready for Your Honour to depart and take possession of Bombay, and the fleet will be paid to-morrow if it is not already paid. This, which was the only thing wanted to be done, could not be effected on account of the death of Francisco de Mello de Castro, of which

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., pp. 465-466. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, p. 39.

Your Honour must have heard. Mr. Henry Gary carries the memorandum which Your Honour required of me, by which Your Honour will observe little difference can arise on the part of, or with, the ministers that are going with you, because all the articles are conformable to the treaty between the two Crowns. Should Your Honour require anything else of me, you will find me ready and with good will. May God preserve Your Honour.”¹

This memorandum, consisting of several articles, seems to have been a draft of the conditions on which Bombay was to be surrendered. Humphrey Cooke afterwards alluded to this document in the following terms:

“Some ten days after this² he [the Viceroy] writes me that the persons were nominated and in readiness to embark for Bombay to make the rendition; and [he] sends me a paper that contains several articles and conditions made by him, that I should observe and sign after the receipt of the Island, which I promised I would, and did, as appears by the said papers of the rendition; for otherwise there would have been one thing or another to have excused the delivery, while [waiting for] further orders from Europe.”³

Humphrey Cooke has been ruthlessly criticised for signing these articles; but those who found fault with him did not realise the desperate straits in which he was.

“Our boats we came in were rotten and ready to sink; so [we] could not possibly hold out any longer, if there had been made any scruple or doubt in the delivery of the island.”⁴

In short, Humphrey Cooke was as anxious to leave Goa as he had been to get out of Angediva; and so he was ready to sign anything and everything which they wished him to sign.

In the light of the articles which Humphrey Cooke was asked to sign, it may be said that the Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Castro, when he could no longer persevere in his policy of open opposition, showed himself to the bitter end an enemy of the British. After the Viceroy's letter of the 29th December 1664; it took about ten days more before Humphrey Cooke set sail for Bombay. In Cooke's own words:

“We set sail from Goa to Bombay on the 7th January, 1665.”⁵

¹ Campbell, M. S. A., Vol. I, p. 15.

² Probably after the Viceroy's letter of the 26th December, 1664.

³ Khan, A. P. N. B., p. 466. ⁴ Ibid., p. 465. ⁵ Ibid.

X Conditions of Surrender

Rendition of Bombay

The voyage from Bombay to Goa took a long time. Humphrey Cooke gives the following account of it:

"[We were] accompanied by ten galliots [small galleys] that brought the Chancellor of Goa and the Viasor dafazanda [Vereador da fazanda], who were the persons appointed to make the surrender of Bombay. Both were very ancient men. By the way they fell sick, so put into Chaul, where we stayed 8 days for their recovery. On the 2nd February, 1665, we arrived at Bombay, being there detained on board 6 days more, while the city and gentry of Bassein came to be present at the delivery as witnesses. On the 8th we landed our men in arms to receive the island in our King's Majesty's name which was done with all the ceremony and honour."¹

A detailed description of the surrender has come down to us in a document entitled *Instrument of possession*.

[On the acceptance of these Articles (the conditions imposed by Antonio de Mello de Castro) "possession was immediately given, and delivery was made of the Island of Bombay and its port, which comprehended in its situation the villages of Mazagon, Parel and Worli; and the said Governor Inofre or Humphrey Cooke accepted and received it, saying he did receive possession and delivery of the Island of Bombay and its port in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain, in the manner and form contained in the instructions from the Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Castro with all and every declaration, clause and condition of the said instructions, all of which are here fully expressed and declared."²

Thereupon Humphrey Cooke pledged his word, the word of an English gentleman:

"Promising in the name of the Most Serene King of Great Britain that there was not or should not at any time come any defect in part or full against this instrument; on the contrary that he [the King] should himself, his heirs and successors, servants, subjects and ministers comply with the whole of the articles and conditions agreed upon, without the least doubt."³

¹ Khan, A.—P. N. B., p. 466.

² *Bombay Record Office, 1796, Foreign Powers, 39.* ³ *Ibid.*

Then follows an account of the ceremony of taking possession, so minute as to be the work of an eye-witness with an Homeric turn of mind for wealth of detail and simplicity of expression.

“And saying, assuring and promising [to do] so, he [Humphrey Cooke] took himself personally possession and delivery of the said port and island of Bombay, walking thereupon, taking in his hands earth and stones, entering and walking upon its bastions, putting his hands to the walls thereof, and walking also on the said island, taking into his hands the earth and stones thereof, and making all other like acts, which in right were necessary, without any impediment or contradiction; and he accordingly took possession and delivery of the said port and island of Bombay very quietly and peaceably.”¹

The relations between the inhabitants and their new Master, the King of England, are clearly described:

[Humphrey Cooke took quietly possession] “that the Most Seren King of Great Britain might have, possess and become master (also his heirs and successors) of the said port and island in the form and manner stipulated in the agreement between the two Crowns and in the instructions from the Viceroy; and for the inhabitants thereof, gentlemen and proprietors of estates and properties within the circuit and territories of the said island above-mentioned, who pay foros to the King our Master, may pay the same henceforth to the Most Serene King of Great Britain, who is in charge and invested with the possession of the said island in the manner and form abovementioned . . .”²

Treaty of 1665

The instructions of the Viceroy comprised the signing by Humphrey Cooke of the conditions of surrender, published by Forrest, and entitled: “Copy of treaty or articles on which Antonio de Mello de Castro, Viceroy of Goa, delivered up the island of Bombay to Humphrey Cooke, 14th January, 1665”. Under the treaty is written: “Given at Pangim, the 15th January, 1665.”³

The articles are here given in an abbreviated form with subdivisional headings, under which they may be grouped:

I. Territory ceded

(1) The island of Bombay is ceded; the other islands under the jurisdiction of Bandra remain in Portuguese hands.

¹ Ibid. ² Ibid. ³ Forrest, S. H. S. Vol. II, pp. 377-379.

(2) Neither Bandra nor any other Portuguese port is to be interfered with.

(5) Portuguese ships are free to sail in and out of the Bay of Bombay.

(7) The inhabitants of Salsette, Karanja and Baragao are to enjoy their customary fishing rights.

II. Religious Rights

(4) The religion of the inhabitants is in no way to be interfered with.

(12) The Catholic Clergy are to be treated with respect, and Catholic churches are to be used for Catholic worship only.

(9) Deserters are not to be allowed to change their religion in order thus to prevent their being delivered up.

III. Proprietary Rights

(10) The lady proprietrix of Bombay loses her manorial rights, but remains in possession of her estates, which the English cannot force her to sell. If the English wish to take her houses to build forts, they must pay her their just value. Her heirs and successors will be the rightful owners of these estates, which the English are free to acquire on the payment of their just value.

(6) All the landowners of Bombay, residents and non-residents, are free to farm their estates or to sell them. If the English wish to acquire them, they are entitled to buy them at their just and equal value; otherwise the owners can make use or dispose of their estates as heretofore.

(13) The inhabitants of Bombay shall not be forced to pay more than the *foros* (quit-rents) they used to pay to the King of Portugal.

(11) Revenues accruing from patrimonials of Crown lands cannot be taken away.

IV. Anglo-Portuguese relations

(3) Neither deserters, nor Gentoos or others indebted to the Portuguese, are allowed to seek shelter in Bombay.

(8) Kunbis, Bhandaris and the rest of the people Abunhados (a sort of people bound to serve the land-holders) or inhabitants of the villages under Portuguese jurisdiction shall not be allowed to settle in Bombay.

(14) There shall be understanding and mutual friendship between the two contracting parties.

Antonio de Mello de Castro was of opinion that the above-mentioned articles were not an innovation on the treaty of 1661. This may well be so; at the same time it cannot be denied that the 14 articles constituted a debatable interpretation of the 11th clause of the treaty of 1661; and they were thus liable to become the source of endless difficulties and dissensions.

As regards the territorial cessions, the territory ceded was limited to Bombay proper, Mazagaon, Parel and Worli. Colaba island, Mahim, Vadala and Sion were excluded.

According to Foster: "The Portuguese Commissioners, probably under local pressure, took advantage of Cooke's pliancy to narrow down to the utmost the territory to be ceded even the Viceroy's instructions to the Commissioners appear to have accepted the strait between Bombay and Salsette as the proper dividing line."¹

Foster bases his 'probable' inference on the 7th article of the conditions of surrender.

"The inhabitants of the said islands of Salsette, Karanja and Baragao and of other places of our jurisdiction shall freely fish in the said Bay and river and in the arm of the sea which enters and divides Bombay from Salsette by Bandra till the Bay."

Another 'probable' explanation is that the article merely meant to determine the customary fishing grounds; the channel separating Mahim and Vadala from Bombay being too narrow and too shallow for fishing purposes.

But what is a gratuitous assumption on Foster's part is that the conditions of surrender were forced upon Cooke by the Commissioners, 'probably under local pressure'. The conditions of surrender

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667. p. 40.

were dictated by Antonio de Mello de Castro, at Pangim, on the 14th January, 1665, before Humphrey Cooke left Goa. It was at Goa that Cooke accepted these conditions; he signed them at Bombay, where, immediately before taking possession of the island, the documents relating to the cession were solemnly read and Cooke's credentials produced and examined.¹ But these documents had been drawn up, not by the Commissioners, but by the Viceroy himself.

Danvers' account is true to fact: When the English Governor (Humphrey Cooke) asked the Commission to define the position of the territories of Bombay and of the villages Mazagaon, Parel, Worli, Mahim, Sion, Dharavi and Vadala, the Commissioners replied that they were not instructed to hand over villages, but the island of Bombay, which, as was well known, lay surrounded by the sea. They did however define the position of Mazagaon, Parel and Worli, which belonged to the territory of the said island.²

Validity of Treaty

There remains the question of the validity of the conditions of surrender as accepted by Humphrey Cooke. In the first place there is not the least doubt that Humphrey Cooke signed the articles, if not cheerfully, at least freely and uncompelled. It is equally plain that he did not mean to keep the treaty he had thus entered upon; for he wrote:

"But now I have possession, I shall no more observe his (the Viceroy's) articles than convenient."³

However much one may sympathise with Humphrey Cooke in his trials, an unqualified approval of his resolve would open a door to unprincipled opportunism. Treaties are not scraps of paper now-a-days, nor were they in the year 1664, unless every canon of right moral behaviour be simply swept overboard. Hence Humphrey Cooke's resolve, as it stands, is not likely to meet with any honest man's whole-hearted approval, though it is possible and even easy by pleading attenuating circumstances to give colour to

¹ Ibid., p. 41. ² Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, Vol. II, p. 343.

³ Khan, A.—P. N. B., p. 456.

Cooke's way of acting. But when it comes to the blunt question whether Humphrey Cooke was a sportsman and played the game, the answer according to the British conception of cricket seems to be in the negative.

What militates against absolving Humphrey Cooke of treaty-breaking and what is implied thereby, is that it took the authorities at home 12 years to make up their mind to denounce the conditions of surrender.

Humphrey Cooke signed the articles on the 8th February, 1665; Charles II of England repudiated Humphrey Cooke's treaty on the 10th March, 1677. On that day he wrote to Luiz de Mendoca Furtado de Albuquerque, Conde de Lavradio and Viceroy of India.

"Our subjects throughout the East Indies exercising trade have lately preferred their complaints to us that they had experienced little of that friendly behaviour which they expected from the Portuguese nation; but, on the contrary, had met with much worse treatment there than the Treaty of marriage between us and our dearest Consort seemed to promise. In order to remedy this evil, our intention is shortly to elucidate and explain the eleventh article of that Treaty conjointly with our aforesaid brother, the Most Serene Prince of Portugal, by whose justice we doubt not our sovereign rights in the port and island of Bombay and their dependencies will be vindicated from that very unjust capitulation which Humphrey Cooke was forced to submit to at the time when that place was first transferred to our possession; which capitulation neither he, Humphrey, was empowered to come into, nor any one else to impose upon him, in contravention to a compact framed in so solemn and religious a manner. We therefore are determined to protest against the said capitulation as prejudicial to our Royal dignity and derogatory to our right, which we held in the higher estimation for coming to us in part of the dowry with our aforesaid dearest Consort."¹

King Charles II's statement about "the capitulation which neither Humphrey was empowered to come into, nor any one else to impose upon him" has led some writers to assert as an undeniable fact that Humphrey Cooke had no authority to enter into any such agreement of terms. But those writers have lost sight of the

¹ Missing Papers, Vol. XIV.

instructions sent to Sir Abraham Shipman from Whitehall on the 31st October, 1663, already quoted.

“And if in the surrender anything be detained from you that you think the article in the treaty (of which you will also herewith receive an authentic copy) entitles His Majesty to, you are to take what is given and protest against the detention of the rest.”¹

These instructions Humphrey Cooke carried out. He took what was given. Where he failed to do his duty was in not registering a formal protest against the articles he subscribed to. As has already been said, he did not do so lest further complications should cause an additional delay. It is precisely on account of his not publicly protesting that Humphrey Cooke was not entitled legally and morally to observe or ignore the articles of the conditions of surrender as it would prove convenient.

Finally the question presents itself whether the formal denunciation of a treaty, twelve years after it has been concluded, is, according to the usage of international law, to be looked upon as a valid political instrument? In the abstract this question may lead to lengthy and learned disquisitions, but in the case of Bombay Island there does not seem any reason why a negative reply should not be given to it. By the year 1677 the conditions of surrender had been more honoured in the breach than the observance, so that the question of their validity was then raised for no other purpose than obtaining further concessions from the Portuguese.

¹ Khan, A.—P. N. B., 447.

XI Epilogue

What became of the Portuguese Viceroy Antonio de Mello de Castro who played such an important part in the cession of Bombay?

On the 5th January, 1665, he wrote to his royal Master:

"By the way of England has reached me this year a letter from Your Majesty on the surrender of Bombay. Although the warrant that was shown to me was more doubtful than the first, being addressed to a man who was dead and had no successor, but understanding that it was Your Majesty's pleasure, and the whole Council having decided that possession should be given without further delay, and the Supreme Court of Judicature being of opinion that the warrant, notwithstanding its form, was sufficient, I ordered the Vereador da fazenda and the Chancellor of the State to proceed to the north for this purpose, and gave them directions, a copy of which is sent herewith. I confess at the feet of Your Majesty that only the obedience I owe to Your Majesty as a vassal could have forced me to this deed; for I foresee the great troubles that from this neighbourhood will result to the Portuguese, and that India will be lost the same day in which the English nation is settled in Bombay. I have faithfully responded to the trust which Your Majesty has reposed in me, appointing me to this post, and to the honour I have inherited from my ancestors. I have been actuated by these feelings during all the time that I have been informing Your Majesty of the inconvenience of this resolution, giving my reasons for not surrendering the island. I hope from the greatness of Your Majesty that, after seeing my papers, you still commend the judgment of my acts, and that they will be found to be in accordance with my duty. Your Majesty being well served and my zeal is the only reward I aspire to. God preserve the Catholic and Royal Person of Your Majesty as Christendom and vassals have need."¹

In the light of subsequent events Edwardes rightly remarked, "There is something pathetic in this last appeal of the Viceroy, who fully recognised the possibilities of world-greatness which underlay 'the inconsiderableness of the place of Bombay', and knew by instinct that his race could never be the dominant power in Western India, if once 'the poor little island' as Pepys querulously termed it, were handed over to the men of England.

¹ Khan, A. P. N. B., pp. 460-461. Edwardes, *The Rise of Bombay*, p. 91.

Though Antonio de Mello de Castro was not aware of it, his letters to Lisbon had deeply impressed the Authorities. When in his letter of the 28th December, 1662, he had suggested that the English claim should be compromised by a money payment, the Court of Lisbon opened negotiations with the King of England to this effect. Francisco Ferreira Rebello was sent to London, ostensibly to inform the King of England that instructions had been sent to Goa for the immediate surrender of Bombay, but he was also entrusted with the secret mission to effect the repurchase of that island.

Charles II of England, who was always in need of money, was not adverse to this proposal. But he insisted that the expenses already incurred by the equipment of the Expeditionary Force should also be made good; so that the sum demanded by him amounted to £229,862 and 14 shillings. Such a demand was of course outrageous. For even Antonio de Mello de Castro, who seems to have been aware of the importance of Bombay, never dreamt of such a sum of money, when he wrote:

"In another letter to Your Majesty I say that Your Majesty can give [to repurchase Bombay] from 200 to 300,000 cruzados [£25,000 to £37,000] in three years; but now I say Your Majesty can give 500,000, 600,000, nay, even 1,000,000 cruzados [£62,500, 75,000, 125,000]; and I undertake to say that all in this State, who would be pleased to be free from such a yoke, would assist in carrying out the arrangement."¹

Charles II wanted nearly the double of the last mentioned sum. But he was ready to bargain, and he imparted orally to Francisco Ferreira Rebello that he would be satisfied if King Alfonso "would lay down a sum that might be considerable, proportioned rather to the necessity of his present affairs than to the amount demanded."²

There is therefore every likelihood that if Antonio de Mello de Castro had refused to surrender Bombay on the plea that he could not make the surrender to Sir Abraham Shipman, since the

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., p. 248. ² Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, p. 57.

latter had died, his further procrastination would have been commended at the Court of Lisbon and would even have been secretly approved of by Charles II.

As it was, by a dire irony of fate, Antonio de Mello de Castro was too prompt in obeying. For, when Francisco Fereira Rebello returned to Lisbon with the English King's answer in the spring of 1665, active steps were being taken there to profit by Charles II's pecuniary needs. On the 15th April, 1665, the King of Portugal wrote to Antonio de Mello de Castro:

"I, King send you greeting. On account of the difficulties raised for the delivery of Bombay, I dispatched to England Francisco Fereira Rebello, charged with this affair alone, to try to compose this matter; and the Marquis of Sande, Ambassador Extraordinary, who was in that Court, made all diligence; and finally the King, my good brother, by the good will he has for my things, allowed the consideration of an indemnity in money; but he wants such large sums that they reach to millions. Thus it is necessary to make great efforts and to use all means to collect them. As it is not possible to settle this affair without giving at first a considerable sum; and as this kingdom with the wars of Castile is found to be in want of means, which is well known, it is necessary to draw as great a part of this amount from the State of India as, according to what you wrote me upon the subject, it may be possible to obtain. For this reason I order and much recommend that, in the manner that you may deem convenient, you try to collect without delay a contribution and remit by the first ship all that you can, in order that, in case any settlement be arrived at, whatsoever sum is necessary, be ready. And in case it fails, the sum collected would remain as a contribution of peace with Holland. The matter being so important to all people, I trust they will contribute with a goodwill the matter demands; and you will be doing me a particular service in preparing everything that there is need of."¹

This letter was evidently written before the news of the surrender of Bombay had reached Lisbon. What is more, it would seem that the King of Portugal was under the impression that Bombay was still in Portuguese hands, and that he was confident of a favourable issue to the negotiations. When the official information of the surrender of Bombay became known at the Court of Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, the British consul at Lisbon, wrote on the 3rd August, 1665, that the news of the transfer had proved

¹ Da Cunha, O. B., p. 256.

a great blow to the Portuguese, because "they thought that all difficulties for not delivering that place according to the articles were overcome, and the place to remain in their possession."¹

Even after the Court of Lisbon had been officially informed that Bombay had been surrendered, King Alfonso continued to entertain hopes that the treaty might be rescinded, and that Bombay might revert to Portugal. To what extent the Court at Lisbon allowed itself to be swayed by Antonio de Mello de Castro's report on the political and religious reasons for not giving up Bombay, may be gathered from a letter from Dom Francisco de Mello, the Portuguese Ambassador at London, who wrote on the 14th February, 1666, to the King of England that he had been instructed to reopen the negotiations for the repurchase of Bombay, in spite of the fact that Bombay was already in English hands. The Ambassador added by way of explanation:

"The scandal and complaints of his subjects from all hands increasing daily, to his great disturbance at home as well as in India, where they yet express, in their many and pressing instances, hopes of returning to live under His Majesty's obedience in more secure possession of their property and free enjoyment of their religion, the King, my master, thinking himself obliged to endeavour the peace and quiet of his people by all possible means, has commanded me to continue and prosecute a treaty of satisfaction."²

The Ambassador was well aware of the little knowledge which people in England had of Bombay; so he made bold to represent to the King "that the conveniences of the island are at very present very inconsiderable."³ It was also pointed out that the military establishment at Bombay would prove a serious drain on the royal treasury, whilst there was a permanent danger of the island being attacked and captured by the Dutch.

However the renewed negotiations ended in smoke. The King of Portugal had not the money at his disposal to carry his point with Charles II. Perhaps the latter also feared lest the giving up of Bombay would greatly add to his unpopularity, or would at any rate give his enemies an occasion to remind Englishmen of

¹ Foster, E. F. I., 1665-1667, p. 57. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid.

the surrender of Dunkirk to France; and thus it came about that Bombay remained in English hands.

It was probably towards the end of 1665 or in the beginning of 1666 that Antonio de Mello de Castro received the King's letter dated the 15th April, 1665. Then he read to his dismay that he could safely have persevered in his game of refusing to surrender Bombay. But the news came too late. Poor Antonio! if he had only known it before.

After the surrender of Bombay the Portuguese Viceroy did not stay much longer in India; and the English were glad when they heard that he was about to go home. On the 1st January, 1666, the President and Council at Surat wrote to the Company:

"We hear [he] is lately put into Goa, and proffers his ship for sale, which they say the Viceroy [Antonio de Mello de Castro] is in hand to buy, intending to take his passage in her to Lisbon, upon report that another is already come out of Portugal to replace him; which we are not sorry to hear, since a greater enemy to our nation than he has approved himself cannot well come in his place."¹

This statement is true to fact. But it does not explain how and why Antonio de Mello de Castro developed such an anti-British complex. There is however nothing mysterious about his enmity against the English. It was neither inborn nor inherited; it developed suddenly, when Antonio de Mello de Castro had already reached the years of manhood; and it was solely caused by the tactlessness of Captain Minors, who was in command of the ship with which the Viceroy came out to India. Had Antonio de Mello de Castro been treated with that obsequious attention to which he considered himself entitled, he would have been a friend of the English, and the latter would have spared themselves much trouble and annoyance.

On the 17th October, 1666. Antonio de Mello de Castro ceased to be Viceroy, and was succeeded by Joao Nunes da Cunha. In February, 1667, he returned home by the ship *S. Pedro de Alcantra*. He died in 1689.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

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